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In federal court, various appealability doctrines govern whether a decision can be
immediately appealed. Some doctrines apply to clearer categories of orders, like
injunctions. Others apply to more amorphous categories of orders, like the different “final
decisions” appealable under multiple interpretations of the final-judgment rule. The
Supreme Court has directed courts to decide appealability based only on whole categories
of orders, not on the facts of individual cases. But that categorical imperative has not
stopped courts from creating varied new categories of orders to deem final-for-appeal.
This paper draws on insights from cognitive psychology to understand how courts
conceive of categories of orders. Cognitive psychologists have shown that people
understand the world using not only “classical categories” based on logical definitions,
but also “conceptual categories” based on fuzzier, intuitive concepts of similarity and
typicality. This paper approaches appealability as a two-step process—first, categorizing
the order and, second, applying the appropriate doctrine. Previous interventions have
focused on whether different doctrines use rules or standards at the second step. This
paper focuses on the initial categorization step.
This paper makes two contributions to the study of federal appealability. First, it
maps the appealability doctrines on both a rules–standards continuum and a classical–
conceptual categorical continuum. It shows that different applications of the finaljudgment rule employ different categorical approaches. Sometimes, when applied to
formal final judgments and truly final orders, the final-judgment rule uses classical
categories of finality. But in other applications, particularly the finality-for-appeal
doctrines, it uses conceptual categories. Second, this paper argues that, despite the
Supreme Court’s categorical imperative, courts should employ a flexible conceptual
approach to identify new categories of orders that are final-for-appeal. It posits some
potential features of those new conceptual categories. Over time, intuitive, conceptual
categories could produce more definite classical categories, but only if courts have the
opportunity to implement and iterate on them. Shutting down the finality-for-appeal
doctrines because of the Court’s categorical imperative would frustrate that development.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to federal appeals, every lawyer knows at least two things. We all
know the final-judgment rule: yRXFDQDSSHDORQO\IURPDGLVWULFWFRXUW¶V³ILQDOGHFLVLRQ´
at the end of the case.1 And we all know that the final-judgment rule is not really true.
There are exceptions that allow immediate appeals from non-final decisions. And there are
judge-made doctrines that deem other decisions final-for-appeal, even though they do not
end the case. It is probably safe to say that we also all know that the resulting system of
federal appealability doctrines is complex and sometimes confusing.2
The doctrines governing appealability in federal court are numerous and varied.
They are found not only in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 but also in statutes,4 and
case law.5 They can be bright-line rules that always allow immediate appeals or contextual
standards that only sometimes allow them, or they can seem to combine both rules and
standards. They are all related to the venerable final-judgment rule, but the relationship is
not always clear, and the contours of the final-judgment rule itself are murky.
This is not to say that the appealability doctrines are broken. Indeed, for most cases
they work well²determining whether an order is immediately appealable is just a matter
of applying the appropriate rule or standard. For the cases that do not fit neatly within an
existing doctrine, the Supreme Court has imposed a type of categorical imperative to direct
how courts decide them.6 First, the Court has held that judges may not create new
appealability doctrines.7 If a judge wants to permit an appeal from a decision that is not
covered by an existing doctrine, the judge must explain why the decision should
nonetheless be deemed final-for-appeal under the final-judgment rule.8 Second, the Court
has held that judges making that finality-for-appeal determination must do so based not on
WKH³SDUWLFXODULQMXVWLF[es]´RIDVSHFLILFFDVHEXWRQ³WKHHQWLUHFDWHJRU\WRZKLFKDFODLP
EHORQJV´9
Despite that categorical imperative, the Courts of Appeals continue to identify new,
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The current system has bHHQVXEMHFWWRPXFKFULWLFLVP³KRSHOHVVO\FRPSOLFDWHG´³legal gymnastics´
³GD]]OLQJ LQ LWV FRPSOH[LW\´ ³XQFRQVFLRQDEOH LQWULFDF\´ ZLWK ³overlapping exceptions, each less
OXFLG WKDQ WKH QH[W´ ³DQ XQDFFHSWDEOH PRUDVV´ ³GL]]\LQJ´ ³WRUWXUHG´ ³a jurisprudence of
XQEHOLHYDEOH LPSHQHWUDELOLW\´ ³KHOWHU-VNHOWHU´ ³a crazy quilt,´ ³a near-FKDRWLF VWDWH RI DIIDLUV´ D
³6HUERQLDQ%RJ´DQG³sorely in need of limiWLQJSULQFLSOHV´
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238±39 (2007) (citations and
internal footnotes omitted).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), 54(b).
4. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292.
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
6. 0\XVHRIWKHWHUP³FDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH´LVVRPHZKDWWRQJXH-in-FKHHN:KLOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
GLUHFWLYHGRHVQRWKDYHWKHPRUDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRI.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHWR³[a]ct only according to that
PD[LPZKHUHE\\RXFDQDWWKHVDPHWLPHZLOOWKDWLWVKRXOGEHFRPHDXQLYHUVDOODZ´LWKDVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPH
structure: only allow appeals according to a rule whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should be a
universal rule to allow appeals from that entire category of decisions. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James Wesley Ellington trans., +DFNHWW3XEO¶J&R3d ed. 1993) (1785).
7. The Supreme Court has directed that any new appealability doctrines must be developed only through
legislation and rulemaking. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 112±14 (2009).
8. Id. at 113±14.
9. Id. at 107 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)).
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2. The criticisms of the federal appealability system are legion.
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10. Compare Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002), with
Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 172±74 (3d Cir. 2006).
11. Compare :KROH :RPDQ¶V +HDOWK Y 6PLWK  )G   WK &LU  (citing Marceaux v.
Lafayette City-3DU&RQVRO*RY¶W)G th Cir. 2013), and In re Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., 641
F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011), with In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices, 641 F. 3d 470, 482 (10th Cir. 2011).
12. Compare Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2016), with DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706
F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013), and NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 749 (5th Cir.
2014).
13. See Matthew R. Pikor, Note, The Collateral Order Doctrine in Disorder: Redefining Finality, 92 CHI.KENT L. REV. 619, 638 (2017) (collecting cases).
14. Copeland v. Ryan, 852 F.3d 900, 904±05 (9th Cir. 2017).
15. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm¶n, 896 F.3d 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
16. See, e.g., Scott Dodson & Elizabeth McCuskey, Structuring Jurisdictional Rules and Standards
Response, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 31 (2012); Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death
of the Balancing Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L.
REV. 371 (2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie]; Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and
Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 (2013) [hereinafter Lammon, Rules, Standards];
John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review
Notes, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 217 (1994); Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards
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contested categories of potentially final-for-appeal orders²usually by applying an
interpretation of the final-judgment rule known as the collateral-order doctrine. The Third
and Ninth Circuits are split over whether interlocutory orders declining to enforce statutes
of repose are final-for-appeal.10 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are split over whether
LQWHUORFXWRU\ RUGHUV ³EHDULQJ RQ )LUVW $PHQGPHQW ULJKWV´ DUH ILQDO-for-appeal.11 The
Second Circuit has split from the Fifth and Ninth over whether orders declining to dismiss
cases under anti-SLAPP statutes are final-for-appeal.12 Three Circuits have held that
orders declining to appoint counsel in civil cases are final-for-appeal, but nine Circuits
have held that they are not.13 The Ninth Circuit, but no other, has held that orders
³UHTXLULQJWKHH[SHQGLWXUHRISXEOLFIXQGVWRUHLPEXUVHDQLQGLJHQWKDEHDVSHWLWLRQHUIRU
FHUWDLQOLWLJDWLRQH[SHQVHV´DUHILQDO-for-appeal.14 The D.C. Circuit, but no other, has held
WKDWRUGHUV³WKDWFKDOOHQJH DQGZLOOFKDOOHQJH >WKH1XFOHDU 5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQ¶V@
OHJDOSRVLWLRQWKDWLWPD\OHDYHDOLFHQVHLQIXOOHIIHFWGHVSLWHWKHDJHQF\¶VIDLOXUHWRFRPSO\
ZLWK>1DWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\$FW@´DUHILQDO-for-appeal.15
This article treats making appealability determinations as a two-step process:
categorizing the order and then applying the appropriate doctrine for that category. These
circuit splits show that courts still disagree about which orders should be appealable at the
second step. But they also show that courts can be endlessly creative in how they conceive
of different categories of orders at the first step. Even when ostensibly constrained by
applying the same collateral-order doctrine, courts categorize orders based on everything
from the law they apply (statutes of repose, anti-SLAPP statutes), to their likely effects
(affecting First Amendment rights, requiring expenditures of public funds), to whom they
affect (parties, nonparties, indigent parties)²and to combinations of all of the above.
There is no single set of features, traits, or aspects of an order that courts agree are relevant
when categorizing orders.
In this article, I do not try to resolve these particular circuit splits but rather to explain
how courts keep recognizing different categories of potentially appealable decisions.
While commentators have examined which doctrinal forms (rules or standards) work best
at the second step,16 less attention has been paid to how courts categorize decisions in the
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to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 507 (2012).
17. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453±54 (1930).
18. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 69 (2003).
19. See generally id.; GREGORY MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS (2004) [hereinafter MURPHY,
BBOC]; Gregory Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, in THE MAKING OF HUMAN CONCEPTS 11
(Denis Mareschal et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?]; Mark L. Johnson,
Mind, Metaphor, Law Symposium: Using Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication, 58 MERCER L. REV.
845 (2007).
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first place. Understanding the initial categorization question means building on the wellknown rules-vs-standards dichotomy to theorize how judges conceptualize categories.
/HJDOVFKRODUVKDYHORQJUHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHODZGHSHQGVRQ³DUWLILFLDO>O\@RUGHULQJ´
the variety of human experience into categories. 17 And cognitive psychologists have
shown that we rely on categories to understand the world in everyday life. 18 But
experiments in cognitive psychology prove that our everyday mental categories work in
surprising ways.19 Categories resist clear definitions; some members seem to fit categories
EHWWHUWKDQRWKHUVDQGFDWHJRULHV¶ERUGHUVDUHIX]]\ZLWKERUGHUOLQHFDVHV)RUH[DPSOH
ZH HDVLO\ XQGHUVWDQG WKH FDWHJRU\ ³%LUGV´ DQG FDQ XVXDOO\ GHFLGH TXLFNO\ ZKHWKHU DQ
DQLPDOLVRULVQRWDELUG%XWZHGRQ¶WUHO\RQDORJLFal definition to do so. And we tend
to feel intuitively that some birds (like robins) fit the category better than others
(flamingoes, penguins, ostriches). And what about, say, feathered dinosaurs?
Our mental categories work this way because people²including judges²do not
usually categorize things according to logical rules and standards. While some of our
PHQWDO FDWHJRULHV DUH ZKDW SV\FKRORJLVWV FDOO ³FODVVLFDO FDWHJRULHV´ EDVHG RQ ORJLFDO
definitions with necessary-and-sufficient characteristics, many are not. Instead we use
intuitive understandings based on perceived similarity. Cognitive psychologists call those
XQGHUVWDQGLQJV ³FRQFHSWV´ 7KHVH FRQFHSWXDO FDWHJRULHV RIWHQ KDYH D SDUWLFXODU UDGLDO
structure: at the center are prototypes and exemplars, quintessential category-members that
we use to anchor the concept. Other category-members are recognized based on our sense
of their similarity to the prototypes and exemplars. We do not categorize animals as
³%LUGV´ EDVHG RQ D UXOH-like dictionary definitLRQ RI ³ELUG´ RU D VWDQGDUG-like sense of
³ELUGQHVV´:HFDWHJRUL]HWKHPEDVHGRQKRZVLPLODUWKH\DUHWRWKHSURWRW\SLFDOH[DPSOHV
of birds in our heads (something like a sparrow, or, more accurately, our mental idea of a
sparrow-like bird).
Sometimes judges must recognize categories of decisions for appeal the same way.
Some appealability doctrines use clear, classical categories and bright-line rules to identify
appealable decisions²but others, particularly the collateral-order doctrine and the other
finality-for-appeal interpretations of the final-judgment rule, use radial conceptual
thinking. The formal final judgment that ends a case is clearly defined by a classical
definition and procedural markers. But the categories of orders that are deemed final-forappeal remain more conceptual and amorphous. Recognizing the role of conceptual
categories in the various appealability doctrines helps explain how judges have reshaped,
and will continue to reshape, the categories of orders deemed final for appeal. And it also
suggests that²HYHQLQOLJKWRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH²judges can
identify categories of appealable orders using conceptual models of finality, rather than
continuing to strive for an unobtainable classical, rule-like purity. Although that
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conceptual approach might not provide the immediate clarity of a bright-line rule, neither
have the numerous existing appealability doctrines. Using a conceptual approach instead
would build on the signature strength of common-law adjudication²evolution over
time²to guide judicial development of new categories of appealable orders.
Part I, below, explains why appeals doctrines matter and the traditional rules-vs.standards approach to describing their formal logic. Part II discusses some recurrent issues
in appealability, including the confusing idea of finality, and the categorical nature of the
appealability inquiry. Part III describes how concept theory and cognitive psychological
concept models explain the different categories we use to understand the world²and the
roles they play in law. Part IV applies concept theory to the major appealability doctrines
(except the finality-for-appeals doctrines), mapping them by both the formal logic and the
categorical models they employ. Part V, applies that same mapping approach to the
finality-for-appeals doctrines and the article concludes that courts should explicitly use
concept models to recognize new categories of orders that are final-for-appeal.
I. UNDERSTANDING APPEALABILITY
Deciding what orders should be appealable implicates the policy debate between the
values of systemic efficiency and individual fairness. Clear rules usually promote
efficiency, while flexible standards usually promote fairness. The history of the major
federal appealability doctrines reflects the development of different rule-like or standardlike strategies to that policy debate.
A. Efficiency and Fairness

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

20. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1423 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)  GHVFULELQJ³WKHFRPSHWLQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQVXQGHUO\LQJDOOTXHVWLRQVRIILQDOLW\²
µthe inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on
WKHRWKHU¶´ see also Pikor, supra note 13, at 622.
23. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1423 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It is generally more efficient to allow fewer
interlocutory appeals, which tends to speed up resolution of cases and lower litigation costs²but also to decrease
fairness in individual cases because some errors are never corrected. It is generally fairer to allow more

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 23 Side B

Justice Breyer recently reiterated why the doctrines governing appealability matter:
On the one hand, ³>t]oo few interlocutory appeals will too often impose upon parties delay
and expense that an interlocutory appeal, by quickly correcting a lower court error, might
KDYHVSDUHGWKHP´20 %XWRQWKHRWKHUKDQG³[t]oo many interlocutory appeals will too
often unnecessarily delay proceedings while a party appeals and loses. And delays can
clog the appellate system, thereby slowing down the workings, and adding to the costs, of
WKHMXGLFLDOV\VWHPVHHQDVDZKROH´21
Deciding which orders should be immediately appealable implicates two conflicting
values: the efficiency of the adjudicative system and fairness to individual litigants. 22 The
need to balance systemic efficiency and individual fairness manifests itself in every aspect
of the design of an appellate system. It influences how many interlocutory appeals to allow:
DOORZLQJWRRPDQ\FDXVHVLQHIILFLHQF\LQWKH³WKHMXGLFLDOV\VWHPVHHQDVDZKROH´ZKLOH
allowing too few is unfair to parties in that system. 23 It also influences what kinds of
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appealability doctrines exist: On the one hand, the need for an efficient court system
demands that appealability doctrines be clear and predictable, saving litigants the needless
HIIRUWDQGH[SHQVHRIGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWRDSSHDODQGVLPSOLI\LQJMXGJHV¶GHFLVLRQVDERXW
which appeals to allow. On the other hand, individual fairness demands that appealability
doctrines be flexible and adaptable to unexpected circumstances where justice demands
an immediate appeal in a particular case. 24
These considerations are not new. The 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV ORQJ UHFRJQL]HG ³WKH
considerations that always compete in the question of appealability the most important of
which are the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger
of denying justice by delay on the otKHU´ 25 And the Court has described the history of
DSSHDODELOLW\MXULVSUXGHQFHDVD³VWUXJJOH´E\WKHFRXUWV³VRPHWLPHVWRGHYLVHDIRUPXOD
that will encompass all situations and at other times to take hardship cases out from under
the rigidity of previous GHFODUDWLRQV´26
B. Rules and Standards
The tension between systemic efficiency and individual fairness is often understood
to implicate the familiar choice between rules and standards. Rules are doctrines that
dictate ahead of time all of the relevant elements and mandate the outcome of a decision
based on the presence or absence of those elements. 27 Standards are doctrines that do not
dictate elements or outcomes ex ante; they describe general goals and guidelines (e.g.,
reasonableness) for the court to apply. Broadly speaking, rules limit judicial discretion and
decision making, while standards expand judicial discretion and decision making. Thus,
³VSHHG OLPLW  PLOHV SHU KRXU´ LV D UXOH ZKLOH ³QR GULYLQJ DW H[FHVVLYH VSHHGV´ LV D
standard.28
The arguments in favor of each are familiar. 29 Rules promote stability, efficiency,
and clarity; standards promote adaptability, fairness, and practicality. 30 The arguments

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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interlocutory appeals, which tends to correct more errors sooner²but also to cause delays and increase litigation
costs. That being said, these are only general tendencies. In a particular case, allowing an appeal before the end
of the case can prolong litigation, increasing litigation costs and delaying resolution of the dispute. But, in another
case, postponing the appeal until the end of the trial-court portion of the case can cause parties to waste time and
effort in trial-level litigation only to have it all undone by a reversal on appeal (or it can cause parties to settle,
thereby preventing some issues from ever being resolved).
24. Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809,
1818 (2018) [hereinafter Lammon, Finality, Appealability]. To be sure, this dichotomy is not as polarized as this
brief description suggests. Predictability also benefits individuals by giving individual litigants notice and
decreasing their uncertainty when making litigation decisions. And flexibility also benefits the system by
allowing for fairer outcomes in specific situations and improving public trust in the adjudicatory system. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Procedural Fairness, 73 SOC. RES. 619 (2006).
25. Dickinson, 338 U.S. at 511.
26. Id.; see also Microsoft v. Baker, 137 S. &W   QRWLQJWKDWDOWKRXJKWKH³GHDWK-knell
WKHRU\´RIDSSHDODELOLW\³likely µenhance[d] the quality of justice afforded a few litigants,¶´LWLPSRVHGD³KHDY\
cost to . . . µWKHMXGLFLDOV\VWHP¶VRYHUDOOFDSDFLW\WRDGPLQLVWHUMXVWLFH¶´ (internal citations omitted).
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 961±62 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559±60 (1992).
28. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2011); Kaplow,
supra note 27, at 560; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 964±65.
29. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.    GHVFULELQJWKHWUDGLWLRQDO³YLFHV´
DQG³YLUWXHV´DUJXPHQWVIRUand against rules and standards).
30. Id. at 383±90; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
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against them are also well known. Pure rules are blunt instruments, often over- or underinclusive, and unresponsive to unforeseen distinguishing features of particular cases. 31
Pure standards are mercurial creatures, often vague, and unpredictable in their application
even to seemingly similar cases.32
To facilitate comparisons, commentators often describe them as if they were
Platonic forms, comparing pure rules with pure standards.33 %XW WKH ODEHOV ³UXOH´ DQG
³VWDQGDUG´DUHEHVWXQGHUVWRRGDVWKHRSSRVLWHSROHVRIDFRQWLQXXPDQXQUHVROYHGDQG
unresolvable dialectic.34 Most legal doctrines use both doctrinal forms and mix rule-like
and standard-like features.35 Indeed, legal doctrines tend to shift from one to the other over
time.36 Rules become more standard-like: when courts adopt unexpected interpretations
to avoid seemingly undesirable outcomes; when multiple rules are subsumed under a
broader standard in the name of restating the doctrine; and when specific rules are reinterpreted or restated as general standard-like goals and principles.37 And standards
become more rule-like: when courts learn to apply them and establish precedential
landmarks; when multiple standards are rationalized or restated under a broad rule; and
when standard-like descriptive terms become rule-like terms of art.38
C. The Rules-Standards Continuum of Appealability Doctrines
The history of the federal appealability doctrines illustrates this tension and
unresolved dialectic. When it comes to appealability, neither formal approach has
prevailed.39 The competing goals of efficiency and fairness have given rise to a patchwork
landscape of doctrines using both forms, with some doctrines appearing to embody both
approaches at once. The major trans-substantive appealability doctrines discussed below40
can be compared on the rules-standards continuum. And most innovations in
appealability²and most proposed reforms²have involved moving particular doctrines
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1685, 1687±1701 (1976).
31. See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561±62; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 957±58; Schlag, supra note 29, at 384±
 GHVFULELQJWKH³VWHUHRW\SHGDUJXPHQWV´DERXWUXOHVDQGVWDQGDUGVLQYDULRXVFRQWH[WV 
32. See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561±62; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 957±58.
33. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561.
34. Schlag, supra note 29, at 383.
35. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561; see also Sunstein, supra note 27, at 960±69 (describing other types of
criteria, such as factors, guidelines, and principles, which share traits with both rules and standards). A common
hybrid example would be a standard that includes specific factors to be considered.
36. Dodson, supra note 28, at 19±20; Schlag, supra note 29, at 429.
37. See Dodson, supra note 28, at 19; Schlag, supra note 29, at 429.
38. See Dodson, supra note 28, at 19; Schlag, supra note 29, at 429.
39. Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 424±25.
40. In addition to the trans-substantive appealability doctrines discussed here, there are subject-specific
appealability doctrines. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)±(3) (provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
DXWKRUL]LQJ DSSHDOV IURP GLVWULFW FRXUW RUGHUV UHIXVLQJ DUELWUDWLRQ IURP ³ILQDO GHFLVLRQ[s] with respect to an
DUELWUDWLRQ´DQGIURPRUGHUV³FRQILUPLQJ´³GHQ\LQJFRQILUPDWLRQRI´RU³PRGLI\LQJFRUUHFWLQJRUYDFDWLQJDQ
[arbitration] award´ 86& 1453(c)(1) (authorizing discretionary appeals from rulings permitting removal
XQGHUWKH&ODVV$FWLRQ)DLUQHVV$FW 86& H   DXWKRUL]LQJLPPHGLDWHDSSHDOVIURPGLVWULFWFRXUWV¶
liability rulings in cases governed by the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA) before the
actions are remanded to state courts to determine damages); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (authorizing immediate
DSSHDOV IURP ³[i]nterlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeDOVIURPILQDOGHFUHHVDUHDOORZHG´ 
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41. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 432±33.
42. Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 564 (1932).
43. See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final
Orders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999); Robert J. Martineau, Defining
Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993).
44. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1997±1998) (proposing more rule-like and more standard-like
versions of the collateral-order doctrine); Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review
of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 (2001); Pikor, supra note 13 (arguing for a more rule-like
collateral-order doctrine); Steinman, supra note 2 (arguing for a rule-like application of the collateral order
doctrine to immunity-appeals, and discretionary appeals otherwise).
45. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978).
46. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
47. The idea of finality has different meanings in contexts other than appealability. In the habeas context, a
GHFLVLRQLVQRW³ILQDO´XQWLO³WKHFRQFOXVLRQRIGLUHFW>DSSHOODWH@UHYLHZRUWKHH[SLUDWLRQRIWKHWLPHIRUVeeking
such review.´ 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)7KH³ILQDOMXGJPHQW´QHFHVVDU\IRUDGHFLVLRQWRKDYHSUHFOXVLYHHIIHFW
LV UHODWHG WR EXW QRW LGHQWLFDO ZLWK WKH ³ILQDO MXGJPHQW´ QHFHVVDU\ IRU DQ DSSHDO See 18A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (3d ed.
2018). Finality under § 1291 is a consideration in determining the scope of review after an interlocutory appeal.
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along the continuum, making them more rule-like or more standard-like. 41
In 1932, Carleton M. Crick wrote an influential article calling into question the
utility and efficiency of the final-MXGJPHQWUXOHDQGDUJXLQJIRUJLYLQJ³WKHDSSHOODWHFRXUW
. . . complete discretionary power as to the cases which LWZLOOUHYLHZ´42 Other scholars
have also called for moving away from bright-line rules and using discretionary standards
to decide appealability.43 Still others have advocated for a clearer system using more
bright-line rules.44 Dissatisfaction and the push-pull of different proposals is apparent in
the history of the federal appealability doctrines.
When legislators and rule-makers feel the need for greater predictability and
efficiency, they enact more rule-like doctrines, such as § 1292(a)(1)±(2), which allow for
appeals from injunctions and receiverships. When they feel the need for greater flexibility,
they enact more standard-like doctrines, such as § 1292(b) which allows for appeals when
a district court finds that an appeal is appropriate to resolve an important issue. And courts
do the same thing. When courts feel the need for greater predictability or systemic
efficiency, they interpret the final-judgment rule more formalistically as a strict rule, such
as when the Supreme Court limited the reach of the death-knell doctrine. 45 But when
courts feel the need for greater flexibility or individual fairness, they interpret the finaljudgment rule more loosely, such as when the Supreme Court first recognized the collateral
order doctrine.46
As a result, the various appealability doctrines are spread along the rules-standards
continuum. Few doctrines are pure rules or pure standards. But each doctrine has more
rule-like or more standard-like characteristics. Very broadly speaking: the earlier statutes
and rules²the original, strict version of the final-judgment rule, and § 1292(a)²tend to
be more rule-like. The twentieth-century statutory and rulemaking innovations²§
1292(b), Rule 54(b), and Rule 23(f)²tend to be more standard-like. Thus, the variable
PHDQLQJVRI³ILQDO´DQG³ILQDO-for-DSSHDO´ZKHQDSSOying the final-judgment rule are all
over the map.
Some of the different meanings of finality can be attributed to the different purposes
to which the idea of finality is put in different legal contexts. 47 But even for the limited
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SXUSRVH RI GHILQLQJ D ³ILQDO GHFLVLRQ´ WR DSSO\ WKH ILQDO-MXGJPHQW UXOH ³ILQDOLW\´ KDV
multiple meanings: It can refer to the formal final judgment, a separate document entered
at the end of a case, by which the district court separates itself from the case, based on the
traditionDO PHDQLQJ LQKHULWHG LW IURP (QJOLVK FRPPRQ ODZ 2U LW FDQ UHIHU WR ³WUXH
ILQDOLW\´48: i.e., a decision made near the end of a case, that decides the merits of the case
³DQGOHDYHVQRWKLQJIRUWKHFRXUWWRGREXWH[HFXWHWKHMXGJPHQW´ 49 Or, in a third sense,
LWFDQGHVFULEH³ILQDO-for-DSSHDO´DGHFLVLRQWKDWFRPHVZHOOEHIRUHWKHHQGRIWULDOGRHV
not decide the merits of the case, and leaves more for the court to decide, but that is
nonetheless considered appealable under one of the judge-made, finality-for-appeal
doctrines.
Incorporating those different ideas of finality, the rule-standards continuum looks
something like Figure 1.

II. RECURRENT APPEALABILITY ISSUES

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1844±50.
48. Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1825.
49. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 299, 233 (1945).
50. Steinman, supra note 2, at 1237.
51. Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
171, 172 (1984).
52. Anderson, supra note 44, at 539.
53. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Steinman, supra note 2, at 1238±39.
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The received wisdom among commentators and courts is that the system of federal
appealability doctrines is a jumble of unsatisfactory solutions to the recurrent problem of
ZKHQWRSHUPLWLPPHGLDWHDSSHDOV,WKDVHDUQHGWKHHSLWKHWRISHUKDSVRQHRIWKH³PRVW
WURXEOHVRPH LVVXHV LQ FLYLO SURFHGXUH´50 The patchwork of appealability doctrines has
EHHQFDOOHGHYHU\WKLQJIURPD³FUD]\TXLOW´ 51 WRD³6HUERQLDQ%RJ´52 to a jurisprudence
³VRUHO\LQQHHGRIOLPLWLQJSULQFLSOHV´ 53 Many of the criticisms and proposals argue that
some or all of the doctrines should be more rule-like²others argue they should be more
standard-OLNH0DQ\LQFOXGLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHILQGIDXOWZLWK
the ambiguities around the concept of finality.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 26 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

HEPPNER, R - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CONCEPTUALIZING APPEALABILITY

5/6/2020 4:09 PM

405

A. The Persistent Problem of Finality
2YHUDFHQWXU\DJRWKH&RXUWODPHQWHGWKDW³>S@UREDEO\QRTXHVWLRQ. . . has been
WKHVXEMHFWRIPRUHIUHTXHQWGLVFXVVLRQLQWKLVFRXUWWKDQWKHILQDOLW\RIGHFUHHV´ 54 As
explained above, § ¶V ILQDO-MXGJPHQW UXOH PDNHV ³ILQDO GHFLVLRQV´ DSSHDODEOH 7Ke
perceived harshness and inefficiency of that rule has led courts to adopt numerous
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHWHUP³ILQDO´VSDZQLQJDKRVWRIIX]]\ILQDOLW\-for-appeal doctrines²
LQFOXGLQJ WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\¶V SUDJPDWLF KDUGVKLS ILQDOLW\ GRFWULQH 55 the collateral
order doctrine,56 and the defunct death-knell doctrine57²each of which treats as final
certain orders that do not actually end the case. The core application of the final-judgment
rule²to formal final judgments entered at the end of a case²is discussed below in Part
IV.A.1. The various finality-for-appeal doctrines are discussed in Part V.
For now, it suffices to note the two fundamental frustrations judges and scholars
often express about the resulting concept of finality, both of which are captured in Justice
%ODFN¶VIDPRXVREVHUYDWLRQLQGillespie:
whether a ruling is ³final´ within the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question
that decision of that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments, and
. . . it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what
might well be called the ³twilight zone´ of finality.58
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54. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. R. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 544±45 (1892). In 1892, the Court referred to
WKHTXHVWLRQRIILQDOLW\DVD³TXHVWLRQRIHTXLW\SUDFWLFH´id., but it repeated the lament well after the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished separate courts of equity and tried to impose some order on the
question of appealability. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
55. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see generally 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910 (2d ed. 1991).
56. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
57. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978).
58. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
59. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
60. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land in Babylon, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942).
61. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152.
62. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
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In other words, the idea of finality is hard to define, and its boundaries are fuzzy.
Finality is hard to define. As the Supreme Court has recognized, its finality
GHFLVLRQVGRQRWJLYHULVHWRDFRKHUHQWXVDEOHGHILQLWLRQ³1RYHUEDOIRUPXOD\HWGHYLVHG
can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable
JXLGHIRUWKHIXWXUH´59 In another famous complaint, Judge Jerome Frank observed that
³µ)LQDO¶LVQRWDFOHDURQH-purpose word; it is slithery, tricky. It does not have a meaning
FRQVWDQWLQDOOFRQWH[WV´60
Finality has fuzzy boundaries. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged (usually
when relaxing the strict final-judgment rule) that, whatever the definition of finality, its
borders are unclear. In Gillespie, Justice Black referred to the ³twilight zone´ of finality.61
And Justice Frankfurter noted in Radio Station WOW WKDW³HYHQVRFLUFXPVFULEHGDOHJDO
FRQFHSWDVDSSHDODEOHILQDOLW\KDVDSHQXPEUDODUHD´ 62
In short, the category of orders that are considered final is not susceptible to a clear
definition and borderline cases keep cropping up. Deciding whether an order is final is less
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OLNHDVNLQJ³LVDSULPHQXPEHU"´WKDQOLNHDVNLQJ, ³LVDKRWGRJDVDQGZLFK"´63 It is a
question of categorization.
B. The Question of Categorization
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63. Distinguished jurists disagree on this crucial categorization question. Compare Sophie Tatum & Caroline
Kenny, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Settles it for Stephen Colbert: Hot Dogs Are Sandwiches, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-stephen-colbert-workout/index.html (Ginsburg,
J., opining that hot dogs are sandwiches), with Judge John Hodgman, A Hot Dog Is Not a Sandwich,
MAXIMUMFUN (Mar. 26, 2020), https://maximumfun.org/episodes/judge-john-hodgman/a-hot-dog-is-not-asandwich/ (Hodgman, J., opining that hot dogs are not sandwiches).
64. As with the rules-vs-standards debate, these tendencies are not absolute. Experience has shown, for
example, that limiting appeals only to a single category of decisions (final judgments) would probably give rise
to so many reversals that it would be less efficient than allowing at least some other categories of orders to be
immediately appealed.
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$OWKRXJKZHQRUPDOO\WKLQNRI³FDWHJRULFDOUXOHV´DQG³FDVH-by-FDVHVWDQGDUGV´DOO
of the appealability doctrines²whether they employ a rule, a standard, or something inbetween²operate categorically in that they each apply only to a particular category of
cases. For example, the final-judgment rule uses a rule permitting an immediate appeal,
but it only applies to orders categorized as final decisions²while Rule 23(f) uses a
discretionary standard for deciding appealability, but it only applies to class certification
orders.
Every appealability doctrine, therefore, implicates not only the question of logical
form (rule or standard?) but also an initial categorization question (what category of
decisions is subject to the doctrine?). When crafting an appealability doctrine, rule-makers
must consider both questions: First, which kinds of orders should be eligible for immediate
appeal? Second, how should courts decide whether a decision is appealable? Likewise,
when judges apply an existing appealability doctrine, they must make two separate
inquiries: First, to what category of decisions does the doctrine apply? And, second, under
the appropriate rule or standard, is it appealable?
The two questions are not always explicit. Courts often seem to skip one or to
conflate them, usually because the outcome is obvious or presumed. For doctrines
employing bright line rules, the rule itself is easily applied, and the difficult analysis
actually happens at the initial categorization step. (It is easy to apply the rule that all final
decisions are appealable; it is harder to identify a final decision.) For doctrines employing
malleable standards, the categorization step can be simple, while the case-by-case
decision-making can be more difficult. (It is easy to identify a class certification order; it
is harder to apply a discretionary standard to decide if LW¶VDSSHDODEOH
These initial categorization questions implicate the policy concerns of systemic
efficiency and individual fairness. As a purely numerical matter, having fewer categories
of appealable orders is more efficient because it tends to decrease the number of appeals,
overall litigation costs, and judicial workload²but having more categories is fairer in
individual cases because it tends to increase the opportunities for error correction.64 It also
makes a difference how the categories are determined or constituted. Categories are not
fixed or stable things. Having clearly defined categories of immediately appealable orders
is systemically more efficient because it tends to decrease the costs of litigating each
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appealability question²but having flexibly described categories is fairer in individual
cases because it allows for more particularized decision-making.65
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the appealability doctrines operate
categorically (without explicitly discussing the categorical inquiry as a separate step). The
&RXUW ILUVW UHFRJQL]HG WKDW VWDWXWHV DQG UXOHV PXVW ³QHFHVVDULO\´ EH GUDZQ ³LQ WHUPV RI
FDWHJRULHV´66²because they do not address the circumstances of individual cases, they set
the rules by which different kinds of cases may proceed. And the Court more recently has
issued a categorical imperative to judges: When applying the finality-for-appeal doctrines,
MXGJHV DOVR PXVW ³GHFLGH DSSHDODELOLW\ IRU FDWHJRULHV RI RUGHUV UDWKHU WKDQ LQGLYLGXDO
RUGHUV´67 -XGJHVPXVWQRW³LQHDch individual case engage in ad hoc balancing to decide
LVVXHVRIDSSHDODELOLW\´68²WKH\³PXVW. . . determine[ LW@DWDKLJKHUOHYHORIJHQHUDOLW\´69
Rather than making ³an µindividualized [appellate] jurisdictional inquiry¶´ EDVHG RQ a
³SDUWLFXODULQMXVWLFH´LQDVSHFLILFFDVHMXGJHV PXVW ³focus[] on µthe entire category to
which a claim belongs.¶´70 That means that judges must not only decide whether the order
EHIRUHWKHPLVD³ILQDOGHFLVLRQ´WKH\PXVWGHWHUPLQHWRZKLFKFDWHJRU\RIRUGHUVWKDW
order belongs, and then apply the appropriate finality-for-appeal doctrine to that whole
category.71
Despite that effort to restrain judicial discretion, history has shown that parties and
judges cannot resist the allure of flexibility and will find ways to push at the boundaries of
any definition.72 *LYHQWKH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHWKDWPHDQVWKH\ZLOl conceive
of new categories of orders to deem final for appeal.73 But that is not to say that judicial
discretion is entirely unhampered by the categorical imperative. Although the category of
final decisions is fuzzy and resists definition, and although judges have some freedom to
formulate new conceptions of categories to deem final-for-appeal, the idea of finality is
not entirely amorphous and there are flexible-but-structured concepts that direct how
judges conceive of categories.
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65. This seems to be the general presumption, but it is not necessarily always true and has not been
empirically verified. See, Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 432 (noting that commentators proposing
solutions disagree about the effects of various reforms on appellate workloads). Whether it holds true likely
depends on context and different kinds of decisions may be more amenable to more classically defined categories
or more conceptually constituted categories, as discussed below.
66. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1957).
67. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995) (citing Digital Equip., Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 868 (1994)).
68. Id.
69. Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 876±77 (1994).
70. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 588 U.S. 100, 101 (2009) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 473 (1978); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868)).
71. The Court has also declared a moratorium on courts creating new finality doctrines through case law.
Swint v. Chambers Cty. &RP¶Q86   ³&RQJUHVV¶GHVLJQDWLRQRIWKHUXOHPDNLQJSURFHVVDV
the way to define or refine when a district court UXOLQJLVµILQDO¶DQGZKHQDQLQWHUORFXWRU\RUGHULVDSSHDODEOH
ZDUUDQWVWKH-XGLFLDU\¶VIXOOUHVSHFW´ ,QVWHDGWKH&RXUWSURYLGHGWKDWDQ\QHZDSSHDODELOLW\GRFWULQHVPXVWEH
created through rulemaking. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714   ³7KHVH FKDQJHV DUHWR
FRPHIURPUXOHPDNLQJKRZHYHUQRWMXGLFLDOGHFLVLRQVLQSDUWLFXODUFRQWURYHUVLHVRULQYHQWLYHOLWLJDWLRQSOR\V´ 
72. Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 410±15.
73. See supra notes 10±15 and accompanying text.
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III. CATEGORY AND CONCEPT THEORY

A. Introducing Categories and Concepts
Cognitive psychology uses concept theory to explain how people understand
categories.74 Psychologists have shown experimentally that we rely on categorical
thinking to organize and structure our lives, 75 and we do not understand most categories
in everyday life by applying formal rules with necessary-and-sufficient elements.76 Nor,
for the most part, do we use standard-like general principles or lists of abstract factors.
Instead, we use mental models to conceptualize categories. Using quintessential members
of a category as central anchors, we create conceptual models with radial structures. And
we use those radial models to identify other category members based on their similarity to
(or difference from) those prototypes and exemplars.77
A category, according to cognitive psychologists, is a set of items (objects, ideas,
SHRSOH  WKDW DUH ³HTXLYDOHQW IRU VRPH SXUSRVH´ WKDW ZH WUHDW ³HTXLYDOHQWO\ LQ RQH RU
DQRWKHUUHVSHFW´78 )RUH[DPSOH³'RJV´LVDFDWHJRU\:Htreat all of the items (animals)
LQ WKH FDWHJRU\ ³'RJV´ HTXLYDOHQWO\ LQ WKDW ZH XVH WKH ZRUG ³GRJ´ WR UHIHU WR WKHP
consider them suitable pets in Western society; require them to be registered with the city;
etc.
Psychological categories structure our interactions with the world. When we think
³;LVD<´ ³)LGRLVDGRJ´ ZHDUHPDNLQJDFDWHJRULFDOREVHUYDWLRQWKDW³;LVLQWKH
FDWHJRU\RI<V´ ³)LGRLVLQWKHFDWHJRU\RI'RJV´ 7KDWFDWHJRULFDOREVHUYDWLRQGLFWDWHV
how we treat Fido. Only by categorizing disparate items together are we able to treat them
DV³HTXLYDOHQWIRUVRPHSXUSRVH´7KDWLVZK\ZRUNLQJZLWKFDWHJRULHVLVFHQWUDOWRWKH
operation of law. Treating disparate things as equivalent for some purpose²WUHDWLQJ³OLNH
FDVHVDOLNH´²is one of the fundamental principles of a just legal system. 79
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74. See WINTER, supra note 18, at 69; MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 41±71; Murphy, What Are
Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19.
75. WINTER, supra note 18, at 69.
76. Cognitive psychologists continue to debate and design experiments to uncover the origins of cognitive
categories. Some see them as biological or evolutionary in origin. Olga F. Lazareva & Edward A. Wasserman,
Category Learning and Concept Learning in Birds, in THE MAKING OF HUMAN CONCEPTS 151 (Denis Mareschal
et al. eds., 2010); Michèle Fabre-Thorpe, Concepts in Monkeys, in THE MAKING OF HUMAN CONCEPTS 201
(Denis Mareschal et al. eds., 2010). Some see them as mental structures that metaphorically represent embodied
realities. Johnson, supra note 19, at 852±56; see generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS
WE LIVE BY (2003). But even without a single unifying explanation, cognitive psychologists have constructed
models that illuminate how we form, understand, and manipulate conceptual categories. WINTER, supra note 18,
at 77±84 (describing structural, neurological, and cross-cultural bases for concept models); MURPHY, BBOC,
supra note 19, at 41±71; Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 16±24 .Whatever their
origins, conceptual categories seem fundamental to human thought, and the concept models psychologists use to
describe them are useful in understanding legal categorization, as well.
77. The two radial models discussed below (the prototype and exemplar models) are based on similarity.
These are not the only concept models cognitive psychologists have identified. We also use concept models based
on, for example, metaphoric, metonymic, and gestalt relationships²and we combine those models into more
complex structures and chains of categorization. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1389 (1988). For the reasons discussed below, prototype and exemplar
models are the most useful for understanding appealability doctrines, and I do not discuss the other models here.
78. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 13.
79. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW  GHG  7KH³LGHDRIMXVWLFH. . . consists of two parts: a
XQLIRUPRUFRQVWDQWIHDWXUHVXPPDUL]HGLQWKHSUHFHSWµ7UHDWOLNHFDVHVDOLNH¶DQGDVKLIWLQJRUYDU\LQJFULWHULRQ
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A concept is the internal, mental representation or understanding of a category²the
idea in our heads by which we understand a category. 80 Concepts are how we identify
categories and category members. Psychologists have studied how people form concepts
and understand categories. They have identified common conceptual models that we use
to understand categories.
B. Classical Categories Based on Logical Definitions
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XVHGLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHQIRUDQ\JLYHQSXUSRVHFDVHVDUHDOLNHRUGLIIHUHQW´ 
80. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 13.
81. Johnson, supra note 19, at 848.
82. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 13.
83. Johnson, supra note 19, at 848. Different cognitive theories use different terminology. For this article, I
haYH UHJXODUL]HG LW DQG UHIHU WR WKH FODVVLFDO YLHZ DV XVLQJ ³GHILQLWLRQV´PDGH XS RI ³FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´ DQG WR
FRQFHSWPRGHOVDVXVLQJ³FRQFHSWV´PDGHXSRI³IHDWXUHV´
84. Id.
85. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 15.
86. Id. at 17±22.
87. These are not the only shortcomings that psychologists have identified with the classical view. Another
SKHQRPHQRQWKDWFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\WKHFODVVLFDOYLHZLVWKDWFDWHJRULHVFDQEH³LQWUDQVLWLYH´&DWHJRULHV
display intransitivity when: A is in category B; B is in category C; but A is not in category C. For example: Big
Ben is a clock; clocks are furniture; but Big Ben is not furniture. Id. at 45. 2U³car seats are chairs; chairs are
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:KDWFRJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJLVWVFDOOWKH³FODVVLFDOYLHZ´RIFDWHJRULHVLVVLPLODUWRWKH
³UXOHV´VLGHRIWKHUXOHV-standards dichotomy. The classical view of categories is that every
FDWHJRU\KDV³DIL[HGVWDEOHDQGREMHFWLYHVWUXFWXUH´81 A classical category is constituted
by a formal definition (a rule) made up of a set of necessary and sufficient characteristics
(elements).82 ³,Q WKLV YLHZ D FDWHJRU\ OLNH µGRJ¶ LV EHOLHYHG WR EH GHILQHG E\ D VHW RI
>FKDUDFWHULVWLFV@DQREMHFWPXVWSRVVHVVWREHWKDWSDUWLFXODUW\SHRIWKLQJZHFDOODGRJ´ 83
If an object has those characteristics, then it meets the definition and it is a dog²if it does
not have those characteristics, then it does not meet the definition and it is not a dog. 84
In the classical view, the membership of categories is definite, not fuzzy. Because
classical categories are made up of necessary-and-sufficient definitions, every item either
does or does not fit within the categorical definition. There are no borderline cases that are
³VRUW RI´ LQ D FODVVLFDO FDWHJRU\85 Every item either is a dog, because it has all of the
characteristics necessary and sufficient to define a dog²RULWLVQ¶WEHFDXVHLWODFNVRQHRU
more of those necessary and sufficient characteristics. This is not to say that the classical
view does not allow for unknowns. It is quite possible, in the classical view, not to know
whether a given item is in a category, but it is not possible for the item to be both in and
RXWVLGH WKH FDWHJRU\ 7KH DQVZHU WR ³LV WKDW D GRJ"´ FDQ EH ³\HV´ ³QR´ RU ³, GRQ¶W
NQRZ´²EXWLWFDQQRWEH³VRUWRI´
Cognitive psychologists have identified at least three shortcomings of the classical
view, three ways that it fails to capture how we understand categories. 86 First, categories
are often indefinable²we recognize categories even when we cannot formulate a
definition composed of necessary-and-sufficient characteristics. Second, categories are
often fuzzy²we recognize borderline items that are both inside and outside some
categories. Third, categories are often graded²even within a given category, we recognize
WKDWVRPHLWHPV³ILW´EHWWHUWKDQRWKHUV87 None of these traits can be adequately explained
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furniture; but car seats are not furniture.´ Id. at 38. This phenomenon is not possible under the classical view,
which allows only for sets and subsets of categories.
88. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66±77 (1951).
89. $V GLVFXVVHG EHORZ :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V H[SODQDWLRQ IRU KRZ FDWHJRULHV ZRUN DOLJQV ZLWK FHUWDLQ PRGHUQ
cognitive psychology theories. Id. at § 70.
90. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 17.
91. Lynne
Peskoe-Yang,
Vegetables
Don’t
Exist,
POPULA
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://popula.com/2019/02/20/vegetables-dont-exist/; Henry Nicholls, Do Vegetables Really Exist?, BBC (Oct.
17, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150917-do-vegetables-really-exist.
92. Peskoe-Yang, supra note 91; Nicholls, supra note 91.
93. Peskoe-Yang, supra note 91; Nicholls, supra note 91.
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by the classical view of categories.
Categories are often indefinable. The classical view of categories is based on
logical definitions consisting of necessary and sufficient characteristics. But in real life our
concepts of categories often do not work that way. The canonical example of this
SKHQRPHQRQLV:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHLGHDRID³*DPH´FDQQRWEH SLQQHG
down to a set of necessary and sufficient characteristics.88 No set of characteristics²
competition, amusement, winning and losing, an element of luck, an element of skill,
etc.²is necessary and sufficient to define a category consisting of everything from chess
to poker to tennis to ring-around-the-rosy to double Dutch to Dungeons & Dragons. And
yet, even though we cannot formulate a definition made up of necessary and sufficient
characteristics that accurately encompass every kind of game, we know what a game is
and what items fit in the FDWHJRU\ ³*DPH´ $OWKRXJK WKH FDWHJRU\ ³*DPH´ LV LQ
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V WHUPV ³XQFLUFXPVFULEHG,´ ZH VWLOO XVH LW DQG XQGHUVWDQG LW89
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V LQVLJKW ZDV WR UHFRJQL]H WKLV SKHQRPHQRQ LV QRW MXVW D VKRUWFRPLQJ RI
classical categorical reasoning, but a strength of human conceptual thought. We can
conceptualize logical, classical categories²but we can also conceptualize other kinds of
categories.
On reflection, many intuitive categorical understandings work this way. For the
FDWHJRU\³'RJ´RQHPLJKWWU\WR identify various defining characteristics: has fur, has four
legs, is domesticated, etc. And, each of those characteristics probably does go into our
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFDWHJRU\³'RJ´%XWWKHUHDUHGRJVZLWKRXWIRXUOHJVGRJVZLWKRXW
fur, and dogs who are wild. We, of course, know what a dog is²but we do not do so
because we have a single set of necessary and sufficient characteristics for the category
³'RJ´90 Similarly, although we all know what counts as a vegetable, it turns out there is
no set of necessary-and-sufficient characteristics to define the category of vegetables.91
Indeed, biologically-VSHDNLQJWKHUHLVQRVXFKWKLQJDVD³YHJHWDEOH´92
Categories are often fuzzy. A necessary feature of the classical view is that, because
classical categories rely on the either/or logic of necessary and sufficient characteristics,
classical categories have strict boundaries and no borderline cases. Although there are
rigorously logical categories with clear boundaries made up of necessary and sufficient
characteristics²FDWHJRULHVOLNH³RGGQXPEHUV´RU³ZRUGVWKDWVWDUWZLWKWKHOHWWHU5´²
most of our useful categories do not work that way. Indeed, when you read in the previous
paragrDSKWKDW³ZHDOONQRZZKDWFRXQWVDVDYHJHWDEOH´\RXPLJKWKDYHWKRXJKW³ZKDW
DERXWWRPDWRHV"3HRSOHDUHDOZD\VDUJXLQJDERXWZKHWKHUWRPDWRHVDUHYHJHWDEOHV´ 93 In
the real world, boundaries between our conceptions of categories are much fuzzier than
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the classical view suggests. A chair is different from a loveseat, which is different from a
sofa²but where exactly is the line between them? 94 The boundaries of categories are not
as clear as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions would make them. 95 Borderline
cases (like tomatoes and loveseats) often arise that cannot be accounted for by the either/or
ORJLFRIWKHFODVVLFDOYLHZ¶VQHFHVVDU\DQGVXIILFLHQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
Categories are often “graded.” Cognitive psychologists have also observed that
people share an intuitive sense that not all members of a category are equally part of the
FDWHJRU\VRPH³ILW´WKHFDWHJRU\EHWWHUWKDQRWKHUV)RUWKHFDWHJRU\³)XUQLWXUH´SHRSOH
WHQGWRWKLQNWKDW³FKDLU´DQG³EHG´ILWEHWWHUWKDQ³SLDQR´DQG³WHOHSKRQH´ 96 Similarly,
IRU WKH FDWHJRU\ ³%LUGV´ SHRSOH WHQG WR UHFRJQL]H WKDW ³URELQ´ ILWV YHU\ ZHOO ZKLOH
³RVWULFK´ DQG ³SHQJXLQ´ ILW SRRUO\ 97 This is a different phenomenon from categorical
IX]]LQHVV ,W LV QRW WKDW VRPH LWHPV¶ FDWHJRU\ PHPEHUVKLS LV DPELJXRXV 2striches and
penguins definitely are birds, and people recognize that. 98 And yet we mostly agree that
VRPHELUGV³ILW´WKHFDWHJRU\EHWWHUWKDQRWKHUV7KLVLQWXLWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWFDWHJRU\
membership is graded cannot be explained by the either/or logic of the classical view.
Under the classical view, there is no differentiating among the items within a given
category²all the items that exhibit all the necessary and sufficient characteristics for a
category are equally in that category.
Those three shortcomings of the classical view (that categories are indefinable,
fuzzy, and graded) also suggest another trait of categories for which the classical view, at
least implicitly, fails to account: categories depend on context and purpose. We do not
conceptualize categories in a vacuum. We do so for a reason. Remember, a category is a
VHWRILWHPVWKDWDUH³HTXLYDOHQWIRUVRPHSXUSRVH´99 One answer to whether a tomato is
a vegetable or a fruit might be that it depends on whether you are preparing a salad (where
LW¶VFRQVLGHUHGDYHJHWDEOH RUFODVVLI\LQJSDUWVRIDSODQWLQELRORJ\FODVV ZKHUHLWLVWKH
fruit). Why you are making the category matters to your conception of the category
itself.100

Based on experimental observation, cognitive psychologists have created conceptual
models of how we conceptualize categories. Two such models are the prototype model
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94. Lawrence M. Solan, Legislative Style and Judicial Discretion: The Case of Guardianship Law, 35 INT¶L
J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 464, 467 (2012).
95. $ WUDGLWLRQDO H[DPSOH RI WKLV SUREOHP LV WKH ³VRULWHV SDUDGR[´ DWWULEXWHG WR WKH DQFLHQW SKLORVRSKHU
(XEXOLGHV$OWKRXJKZHNQRZZKDWD³KHDS´LV LWLVDSLOHRIobjects), there is no clear dividing line where a few
objects become a heap and, indeed, the very idea that adding or removing one object from the pile could make
the difference is nonsensical.
96. Solan, supra note 94, at 467 (citing Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
532 (1975) [hereinafter Rosch, Reference Points]); MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 21±22 (citing Eleanor
Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1975));
WINTER, supra note 18, at 76±77.
97. WINTER, supra note 18, at 76 (citing Rosch, Reference Points, supra note 96); Solan, supra note 94, at
467 (discussing S.L. Armstrong, L.R. Gleitman & H. Gleitman, What Some Concepts Might Not Be, 13
COGNITION 263 (1983)).
98. Solan, supra note 94, at 467.
99. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 12.
100. WINTER, supra note 18, at 188±89.
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Id. at § 67.
MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 31.
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101.
102.
103.
104.
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and the exemplar model. Both models rely on a fundamental insight: we do not
conceptualize category membership based on logical binary choices, we think of
categories based on our senses of similarity and typicality.
Similarity and Typicality. To explain how human conceptual categories can be
indefinable, fuzzy, and graded, modern concept theory embraces the principles of
similarity and typicality. Where classical categories are defined by the necessary and
sufficient characteristics of classical definitions, conceptual categories are shaped by how
similar items are to the typical member(s) of the category.
Once again, Wittgenstein provides the canonical example and explanation. To
H[SODLQKLVREVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHFRQFHSW³*DPH´HOXGHVFODVVLFDOGHILQLWLRQKHSRVLWHGWKDW
DOO JDPHV QRQHWKHOHVV VKDUH ³D FRPSOLFDWHG QHWZRUN RI VLPLODULWLHV RYHUODSSLQJ DQG
crisscrRVVLQJ>@ VRPHWLPHV RYHUDOO VLPLODULWLHV VRPHWLPHV VLPLODULWLHV RI GHWDLO´ 101 He
OLNHQHGWKDWQHWZRUNRIVLPLODULWLHVWR³IDPLO\UHVHPEODQFHV´,PDJLQHDVLPSOHQXFOHDU
family. Imagine that: the father, son, and daughter (but not the mother) have similar eye
colors; the mother, son, and daughter (but not the father) have similar hair colors; the
mother, father, and daughter (but not the son) have similar nose shapes; the daughter and
father (but not the son and mother) are similar heights; the mother and son (but not the
father and daughter) are similarly athletic; etc. Although there is no identifiable
characteristic or set of characteristics that they all share (no necessary and sufficient
element by which to identify members of the family), the family members do have shared
features. They resemble each other and can be recognized as part of the same family
because they all VKDUH WKDW ³FRPSOLFDWHG QHWZRUN RI VLPLODULWLHV RYHUODSSLQJ DQG
FULVVFURVVLQJ´102 Wittgenstein likened these similarities to the individual strands that
make up a length of rope.103 Although no single strand runs the entire length of the rope,
they overlap enough that they form a unified object.
Just as shared features mark different people as a single family, and as overlapping
strands make up a rope, overlapping shared features among items can mark them as part
of the same category, even when no single characteristic is shared by all the category
members. Unlike the members of a classical category, which each exhibit every defining
characteristic²the members of a conceptual category can share some, but not necessarily
all, of the same features. They are not identical, but they are similar.
From this principle of similarity, cognitive psychologists have derived the principle
of typicality, which refers to how similar an item is to the prototypical category
member(s).104 The principle of typicality²essentially a measure of the strength of
similarity²allows modern concept theory to explain how categories can be graded. Items
with more, or more significant, similar features are more typical, while items with fewer
VLPLODUIHDWXUHVDUHOHVVW\SLFDO7KHIRUPHU³ILW´WKHFDWHJRU\EHWWHUDQGWKHODWWHUILWOHVV
well. A robin is a more typical examples of a bird than an ostrich. But similar to what,
exactly? What anchors a conceptual category to give some structure to it? Why is a robin
more typical than an ostrich? That is where the prototype and exemplar models come in.
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1. The Prototype Concept Model
The prototype model of concept-formation posits that our concept of a category is
based on a conceptual prototype, an ideal member of the category. 105 The prototype is the
most typical member of a category, the member that, in our heads, represents and thereby
constitutes the category.106 Prototypical concepts are structured radially around a single
prototype that we think of as the quintessential category-member. 107 A prototypical
concept can also be based on a negative prototype²an item that is definitely not part of
the category, that we think of as the opposite. Thus, we decide whether an item is in a
prototypically structured category based on similarity, by asking how its salient features
resemble the prototype and differ from the negative prototype. 108
The prototype model explains the traits of categories discussed above that the
FODVVLFDOYLHZRIFDWHJRULHVFDQQRW%\UHSODFLQJWKHFODVVLFDOYLHZ¶VVWULFWQHFHVVDU\-andsufficient definitions with similarity to positive and negative prototypes, the prototype
model explains how conceptual categories are indefinable. When items share enough
features with the positive prototype and do not share many features with the negative
SURWRW\SHZH³MXVWNQRZ´WKH\DUHPHPEHUVRIDSURWRW\SLFDOFDWHJRU\$QGZHNQRZWKDW
even though the category members do not all share the same necessary and sufficient
elements, and we cannot reduce that knowledge to a logical or verbal definition.
By focusing on similarity and typicality, this model also explains how conceptual
categories can be fuzzy and graded. Categories are fuzzy because items that are equally
similar to a positive and a negative prototype (or that are similar to both, but in different
respects) are borderline category members, giving rise to fuzzy categories.109 Categories
are graded because the more typical an item is²i.e., the more features it shares with the
prototype (and the fewer it shares with the negative prototype)²the better it fits the
category.110
2. The Exemplar Concept Model
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105. Eleanor Rosch & Carolyn B. Mervis, Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of
Categories, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 573, 574 (1975).
106. Johnson, supra QRWHDW ³>3@HRSOHRIWHQEXLOGWKHLUFDWHJRULHVDURXQGSURWRW\SLFDOPHPEHUVDQG
they understaQGOHVVSURWRW\SLFDOPHPEHUVE\YLUWXHRIWKHLUUHODWLRQVWRWKHSURWRW\SHV´ 
107. Id. at 867.
108. Rosch & Mervis, supra note 105, at 586.
109. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 31.
110. Id. (³>T]ypicality is a graded phenomenon, in which items can be extremely typical (close to the
prototype), moderately typical (fairly close), atypical (not close) and finally borderline category members (things
that are about equally distant from two different prRWRW\SHV ´ 7KHSURWRW\SHPRGHOGRHVQRWFRPSOHWHO\H[SODLQ
graded-ness. Even concepts that are not structured prototypically can be graded. For example, the category of
Odd Numbers is constituted by a classical definition, but experiments have shown that we think of some odd
QXPEHUVDVPRUHTXLQWHVVHQWLDOO\2GG1XPEHUVWKDQRWKHUV³,QVXPJUDGHGFDWHJRULHVZLOOSURGXFHSURWRW\SH
HIIHFWVEXWQRWDOOFDWHJRULHVZLWKSURWRW\SHHIIHFWVDUHJUDGHG´WINTER, supra note 18, at 84.
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Although the prototype model provides a better explanation of human conceptmaking than the classical view by accounting for indefinability, fuzziness, and gradation,
it may still be too simplistic to explain complex conceptual categories. Like the classical
view, the prototype model is still based on a single summary representation. Like a
classical definition, a prototype is a single summary idea that we imagine constituting the
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entire category. Just as the classical view categorizes an item by comparing it to the
definition, prototype theory categorizes an item by comparing it to the positive and
negative prototypes. And just as we sometimes cannot formulate a definition for a
category, sometimes we cannot identify a single item that serves as a prototype for a
category, even though we can conceptualize the category.
A potentially more powerful concept model is provided by the exemplar model. The
exemplar model rejects the idea that people have a single, summary representation that
encompasses an entire concept.111 :KHUHWKHSURWRW\SHPRGHOSRVLWV³WKDWSHRSOHOHDUQD
summary representation of the whole category and use that to decide category
PHPEHUVKLS´ WKH H[HPSODU PRGHO SURSRVHV WKDW ³SHRSOH¶V FDWHJRU\ NQRZOHGJH LV
represented by specific exemplars, and categorization involves comparing an item to all
RU PDQ\  VXFK H[HPSODUV´ 112 To deteUPLQH LI D JLYHQ DQLPDO LV D ELUG ZH GRQ¶W MXVW
compare it to a single idealized idea of a bird in our heads, we compare it to many examples
of birds. The exemplar model, thus, accounts for the possibility that we can conceptualize
a category even if we cannot conceive of a single prototypical member. But it also retains
the explanatory potency of similarity and typicality (applied not through comparison to a
single prototype but to multiple exemplars) and thus accounts for categorical fuzziness and
gradation just as the prototype model does.
In sum, we conceptualize categories both classically and conceptually. Classical
categories are composed of definitions made up of necessary-and-sufficient
characteristics. Conceptual categories are composed of radial structures made up of
prototype and exemplar models based on similarity and typicality. Classical categories
draw on the formal logic and either/or structure of elemental rules to definitively determine
category membership. Conceptual categories employ a standard-like weighing of various
factors to determine category membership in fuzzier, less definitive terms. Accordingly,
classical categories are (like rules) more predictable, while conceptual categories are (like
standards) more flexible.

Categories appear throughout the law. As Karl Llewellyn observed nearly 100 years
DJR³%ehavior is too heterogeneous to be dealt with except after some artificial ordering.
The sense impressions which make up what we call observation are useless unless gathered
LQWRVRPHDUUDQJHPHQW1RUFDQWKRXJKWJRRQZLWKRXWFDWHJRULHV´ 113 In short, for law to
govern human activities, it must categorize them, and in order to categorize activities, we
QHHGPHQWDOFRQFHSWVRIWKRVHFDWHJRULHV³/LNHUXOHs, concepts are not to be eliminated;

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

111. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 49 (³,Q WKH H[HPSODU YLHZ WKH LGHD WKDW SHRSOH KDYH D >VLQJOH@
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKDWVRPHKRZHQFRPSDVVHVDQHQWLUHFRQFHSWLVUHMHFWHG´).
112. Id. DW ³>7@KHUHLVFOHDUO\DQHQRUPRXVGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQSURWRW\SHDQGH[HPSODUPRGHOV2QHVD\V
that people learn a summary representation of the whole category and use that to decide category membership.
Category learning involves the formation of that prototype, and categorization involves comparing an item to the
prototype representation. The other vLHZ VD\V WKDW SHRSOH¶V FDWHJRU\ NQRZOHGJH LV UHSUHVHQWHG E\ VSHFLILF
H[HPSODUVDQGFDWHJRUL]DWLRQLQYROYHVFRPSDULQJDQLWHPWRDOO RUPDQ\ VXFKH[HPSODUV´ ; id. ³1RQHWKHOHVV
it is not that easy to tell the models apart. The reason for this is that under many circumstances, the models make
VLPLODUSUHGLFWLRQV´ .
113. Llewellyn, supra note 17, at 453.
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114. Id.
115. See WINTER, supra note 18, at 8± GHVFULELQJWKH³LGHRORJ\´DQG³KHJHPRQ\´RIWKHWKH³UDWLRQDOLVW´
i.e., classical, view). Why the classical view is intuitively attractive is the subject of debate. The formality of the
logic that it enables is particularly useful and attractive to philosophers because it creates a bounded and
manipulatable object, the concept, for philosophical examination. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
ARCHIVE
(Edwad
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Spring
2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/concepts/. Some cognitive scientists attribute the appeal of the
classical view to its metaphorical similarity to the real-world experience of sorting real objects into containers²
an embodied experience that enables a metaphoric understanding of otherwise abstract analytical thought. See
Johnson, supra note 19, at 858±59; WINTER, supra note 18, at 62±64; see generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra
note 76.
116. See Solan, supra note 94, at 466.
117. 7KLQNRI³WKHIROORZLQJ LQFRPSOHWH GHILQLWLRQRIDVWULNHLQEDVHEDOOµWKHEDOOPXVWEHVZXQJDW and
missed OR it must pass above the knees and below the armpits and over home plate without being hit OR the
ball must be hit foul (IF there are not two strikes).¶´MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 16.
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LW FDQQRW EH GRQH´114 Only by dividing the multitude of worldly phenomena (people,
organizations, political entities, actions, statements, beliefs, etc.) into separate categories
can the law then act on them. Lawyers arJXHRYHUZKHWKHUWKHLUFOLHQWV¶FRQGXFWILWVLQWR
legal categories giving rise to liability, like negligence or fraud. Judges and juries rule on
whether the conduct fits in those categories. Legislators pass laws that set the categories
(the edges of which lawyers and judges then test and reshape through creative
interpretation and precedent).
Both the classical view of categories and the conceptual model of categories have
their places in law and legal practice. The classical view has an intuitive appeal, especially
for lawyers.115 Classical rules and definitions appear throughout the law. 116 They have
the same advantages as rules: predictability and clarity. Every first-year student learns that
the common law tort of negligence has four elements: duty, breach, causation, and
damages. That is a classical definition of negligence consisting of four necessary and
sufficient characteristics. That definition determines which conduct falls within the
classical category of negligent conduct. If a certain course of conduct exhibits those four
definitional elements, then that conduct is negligent. If it does not, then it is not.
This is not to say the classical view is simplistic. The necessary and sufficient
characteristics that define a classical category can be related to one another with formal
logical rules, giving rise to more complex definitions and rules.117 Adding IF±THEN
rules, BUT IF±THEN exceptions, and Boolean AND/OR connectors to the classical fourelement definition of negligence creates a system of logical rules to determine liability for
QHJOLJHQFH ,) WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQGXFW ZDV QHJOLJHQW DV GHILQHG DERYH  7+(1 WKH
defendant is liable; BUT IF the plaintiff assumed the risk, THEN the defendant is not
liable; BUT IF the plaintiff is a minor AND the plaintifI¶V LQMXU\ ZDV FDXVHG E\ WKH
GHIHQGDQW¶VDWWUDFWLYHQXLVDQFH7+(1WKHGHIHQGDQWLVOLDEOHHWF,QVKRUWWKHFODVVLFDO
view of categorization is capable of significant complexity and nuance.
But, because any system of classical definitional categories is necessarily built on
nested, binary true/false determinations, it cannot describe all legal doctrines. Just as law
students learn the basic definition of negligence, they also learn (often to their frustration)
that classical categorical definitions frequently fail to fully capture the complexity of the
FRPPRQODZ$VLQ+/$+DUW¶VIDPRXV³QRYHKLFOHVLQWKHSDUN´H[DPSOHLWWXUQVRXW
WKDW ZKDW ILWV LQ WKH FDWHJRU\ ³YHKLFOH´ LV D VOLSSHU\ FRQWH[W-dependent, and fuzzy
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118. HART, supra note 79, at 125±27; H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 606±15 (1957); see also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park
Symposium: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008).
119. Johnson, supra note 19, at 851; see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193±95 (1890) (describing the development of legal protections for dignitary and other intangible
harms, and for intellectual and other intangible property, from concrete physical harms and real property).
120. Johnson, supra QRWH  DW  7KH IDPLOLDU ³EXQGOH RI VWLFNV´ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI SURSHUW\ LV D
PHWDSKRULFDOZD\WRGHVFULEHWKHVDOLHQWIHDWXUHVRIWKH³SURSHUW\´FDWHJRU\,WLVUHPLQLVFHQWRI:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V
rope examSOHDQGWKHVRULWHVSDUDGR[7KH³EXQGOHRIVWLFNV´PHWDSKRULOOXVWUDWHVWKDWWKHLGHDRISURSHUW\QHHG
QRWFRQVLVWRIDQ\VLQJOHSDUWLFXODUULJKWDQGHPSKDVL]HVWKDWWKHUHLVQRGHILQLWHVHWRI³VWLFNV´ ULJKWV WKDWDUH
necessary and sufficient charactHULVWLFVWRGHILQHWKHFRQFHSWRI³SURSHUW\´See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Trademark
as a Property Right, 107 KY. L. REV. 3 (2017).
121. HART, supra note 79DW 7KH³LGHDRIMXVWLFH. . . consists of two parts: a uniform or constant feature,
VXPPDUL]HGLQWKHSUHFHSWµ7UHDWOLNHFDVHVDOLNH¶DQGDVKLIWLQJRUYDU\LQJFULWHULRQXVHGLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHQ
IRUDQ\JLYHQSXUSRVHFDVHVDUHDOLNHRUGLIIHUHQW´ 
122. Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
123. Id. at 317.
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question.118 The classical view of categories cannot accommodate that fuzziness and
ambiguity. A system of legal directives made up only of classical definitions and strict
rules risks arbitrariness and inflexibility to the needs of real-world legal problems.
Fortunately, just as legal doctrines use standards to provide the flexibility lacking in
strict rules, they use conceptual categories when classical definitions prove too rigid.
Prototypical thinking and prototypically structured categories are fundamental parts of the
common law. The category of legal harm, for example, is intuitively structured around a
prototype of physical bodily harm. We conceive of other kinds of legal harm (emotional,
financial, dignitary, etc.) based on their (degrees of) resemblance to the prototypical
physical harms.119 7KH FRQFHSW RI ³SURSHUW\´ LV DQRWKHU SURWRW\SLFDOO\ VWUXFWXUHG
FDWHJRU\ ZLWK ODQG ³UHDO´ SURSHUW\  DV WKH SURWRW\SH IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RWKHU NLQGV RI
property (chattel, stocks and bonds, intellectual property, etc.) based on their varying
degrees of resemblance to the central prototype. 120
Exemplar-based categories are also a key component of the common law tradition.
Many common-law doctrines exhibit greater structure and predictability than pure
standards but have not been reduced to clear definitions or rules. Those doctrines are
developed and elucidated through the accumulation of precedent. Such doctrines
essentially provide that a particular category of cases should be treated similarly, with the
category constituted by a constellation of exemplary precedents. To ³>t]reat like cases
DOLNH´121 judges look first at the exemplary precedents and then, even if those precedents
do not provide a clear definition for the category, assess whether the case at hand fits that
category by gauging its meaningful similarity to the existing precedents.
The doctrine for determining personal jurisdiction over corporations provides a
familiar example from the first year of law school. The requirement from International
Shoe v. Washington²WKDW³DGHIHQGDQW have certain minimum contacts with [the forum
VWDWH@VXFKWKDWWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHVXLWGRHVQRWRIIHQGµWUDGLWLRQDOQRWLRQVRIIDLUSOD\
DQGVXEVWDQWLDOMXVWLFH¶´²is a vague, general standard.122 The International Shoe opinion
provides some guidance as to how the standard should be applied (paying attention to both
the nature and degree of contacts, for example), but it does not provide a clear rule or
definition describing the category of defendants that it subjects to personal jurisdiction.123
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124. See generally id.
125. See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
126. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
127. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
128. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
129. This is essentially what Justice Thomas did when writing for a unanimous court finding no personal
jurisdiction in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
130. See generally Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation
Schemes & Legal Analogy, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 663 (2018); Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy,
Expertise, and Experience Symposium: Developing Best Practices for Legal Analysis, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249
(2017); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
131. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 130, at 251±57; Larson, supra note 130, at 681±83. Among the detractors
of the analogical reasoning in the law are: FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 96±100 (2009);
Brewer, supra note 130, at 962±77 (expressing doubts about the independent utility of analogical reasoning and
arguing that they always depend on inherent, unspoken rules). Among the champions of analogical reasoning
are: LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON 11±13 (2016); Sunstein, supra note 130, at 290±91.
132. See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 130, at 251±58, and Larson, supra note 130, at 674±75 (both
describing the two camps).
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Subsequent cases provided more clarity, sometimes in the form of definitive rules, but
more often because each case serves as an exemplar of the kind of corporate defendant
that is or is not subject to personal jurisdiction. When deciding if there is personal
jurisdiction RYHUDFRUSRUDWHGHIHQGDQWDMXGJHORRNVDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWDQGLWV
contacts with the state and asks whether they are more like the positive exemplars where
there was personal jurisdiction (International Shoe’s salesmen in Washington124 and
Burger King’s franchise contract governed by Florida law125) or more like the negative
exemplars where there was no personal jurisdiction (World-Wide Volkswagen’s car in
Oklahoma,126 Asahi Metal Industry’s tire valve in California,127 and J. McIntyre
Machinery v. Nicastro’s metal-shearing machine in New Jersey128). In doing so, a judge
will identify the salient features of each case and note how similar or dissimilar they are
to the case at hand.129
These uses of prototype and exemplar concept models in law owe something to the
prevalence of analogical reasoning in legal thinking. Arguments for the use of concept
models in the law will, therefore, find support in arguments for analogical reasoning in the
law. Legal scholars have long recognized the centrality of analogies to legal thought and
the development of the common-law.130 By drawing analogies to prior cases, lawyers
argue for, and judges provide, similar treatment in current cases. Analogical reasoning
depends on recognizing similarity between different cases, as do the prototype and
exemplar models. Commentators disagree about how legal analogical reasoning works.
Some argue that analogies necessarily require an intervening rule that makes two different
cases similar, but others argue that lawyers and judges can and should reason from
analogies without articulating, or consciously recognizing, an intervening rule. 131 Those
who believe analogies always require articulable intervening rules typically decry
analogical reasoning, seeing analogies as essentially incomplete syllogisms. Those who
believe analogies do not require articulable rules typically celebrate analogical reasoning
because it reveals underlying connections between cases that are not, or not yet,
apparent.132
Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that analogies are useful precisely because they
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133. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 754.
134. Id.
135. One might argue that reasonableness, fairness and justice are not just vague standards, but rather are
informed by experience and familiarity with prior cases and the law. Quite so. But that amounts to arguing that
they are conceptual categories, based on exemplars of prior cases.
136. ,QGHHG WKH FDWHJRULHV RI ³UXOHV´ DQG ³VWDQGDUGV´ DUH WKHPVHOYHV FRQFHSWXDO categories for different
doctrinal forms. As discussed above, they resist specific definitions, but we know intuitively what we mean by
each, based on prototypical examples like speed limits and driving safely.
137. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 751±54.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 32 Side B

allow legal practitioners to draw connections that are incompletely theorized (not fixed in
a given rule).133 Using incompletely theorized connections to decide cases can have
certain advantages. It (1) helps efficiently decide cases without having to formulate rules
beyond the needs of the case itself, (2) provides precedential guideposts for subsequent
cases, but (3) does not fix legal doctrines in stone before they are fully developed, leaving
room for subsequent cases to expand or contract them.134 Analogies based on
incompletely theorized reasoning provide a kind of bounded flexibility, while leaving open
the possibility of eventually coalescing into more bounded rules as the doctrine develops.
That feature of analogical reasoning²that it enables intuitive connections and
parallels between cases²is also present in conceptual category-making. As we have seen,
for cognitive psychologists, the strength of concept models is they can describe categories
that are not amenable to classical definitions or articulable rules. Similarly, conceptual
categories are useful for deciding cases flexibly, without committing to a classical
definition. But they also leave room for the doctrine to evolve in the future, and for loosely
described conceptual categories to develop into classically defined categories and rules.
There are some arguments against using conceptual categories in law, but they do
not mean we should, or can, do away with conceptual categories entirely. They mean we
need to think carefully about when and how we use them.
2QHSRWHQWLDOFULWLTXHDVNVZKHWKHUDFDWHJRULFDODSSURDFKLVDQ\WKLQJQHZ'RHVQ¶W
it just repeat the formal rules-vs.-VWDQGDUGV GLDOHFWLF" $UHQ¶W FODVVLFDO FDWHJRULHV MXVW
categories defined by rules and conceptual categories just categories defined by standards?
Although this critique has some force when it comes to classical categories and rules (a
classical definition with necessary and sufficient characteristics is essentially a rule with
required elements), it misses two points when it comes to conceptual categories. One, it
oversimplifies how conceptual categories work. They are not abstract principles like
reasonableness, fairness, or justice; they are radial models that explain how we use a
particular abstract principle to build categories based on concrete anchors of specific
prototypes and exemplars. 135 Two, psychologically speaking, recognizing similarity
comes before either rules or standards. We recognize similarity and assess typicality in an
intuitive and incompletely theorized way, even when we cannot formulate rules and
standards. Often, when we do formulate rules or standards to explain our categorical
understandings, they are retroactive back-formations or justifications for a similarity we
recognize intuitively.136 As Sunstein explains in defense of analogical thinking, this
openness to untheorized recognition of similarity makes conceptual categories powerfully
adaptable.137
:KLFKEULQJVXVWRDVHFRQGSRWHQWLDOFULWLTXH6KRXOGQ¶WOHJDOGRFWULQHVHVFKHZWKH
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Developments in cognitive theory make it possible to talk about innovation and constraint free from
the distorting grip of these objectivist assumptions. True, legal materials do not produce patterns that
conform to the rationalist expectations of precision, hierarchy, and determinacy. But it does not follow
that law is indeterminate; we may just be looking for the wrong patterns. Propositional legal rules
promise determinate answers, but the largely imaginative structure of thought yields, instead, a
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138. See, e.g. -RVHSK '¶$JRVWLQR Against Imperialism in Legal Concepts, 17 U.N.H. L. REV. 67 (2018)
(arguing that legal doctrines should be constituted only based only on essential elements).
139. See, e.g., id.
140. See WINTER, supra QRWH  DW  ³7KH UHFRJQition that human rationality is grounded in experience
requires rejection of both the determinacy aspired to by analytic logic and the arbitrariness assumed by most
VRFLDOFRKHUHQFHWKHRULHV´ (emphasis omitted). Further,
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fuzziness and adaptability of conceptual categories for the determinacy and predictability
of rules and classical definitions?138 This argument asserts that law needs greater
essentialism (reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions) to protect individual rights,
and that doctrines that give judges too much discretion give them too much power.139 But
it goes too far when it calls for doing away with conceptual categories entirely in favor of
purely essentialist definitions. First, even if it were normatively preferable for laws to use
only bright-line rules and classical definitions, that does not describe the history of the law
as we know it. As we have seen, even the brightest lines get blurred by unanticipated new
developments and motivated parties and judges. Second, this normative argument
essentially echoes the traditional arguments for rules and against standards, and thus it
repeats the rules-standards dialectic. There are, to be sure, areas of law where bright lines
and classically defined categories work better than conceptual categories. But that does
not mean that they are universally superior²just as law needs both rules and standards, it
needs both classical and conceptual categories.
What about a potential third critique (the mirror image of the second): If legal
doctrines inevitably shift over time, why require even the flexible structure of concept
models? Why not use pure standards and unfettered discretion? The same descriptive and
normative responses apply to this critique as to the previous one. Once again, descriptively,
that is not how the law has evolved. Lawmakers and judges inevitably and necessarily
have developed more and less rigorously structured categories over time. And
normatively, this is another turn in the rules-standards dialectic and all the traditional
responses in favor of bright-line rules apply. There are areas of law where open-ended
standards are more desirable than even the loosely-structured concept models. But that
does not mean unfettered discretion is always better.
As these last two critiques demonstrate, the concept-model approach can be placed
in opposition to both rules and standards. That not only underscores the response to the
first critique, that conceptual categories are not just standards in another guise. It also
suggests that an understanding of conceptual categories adds something new to the rulesstandards dialectic. As we have seen, the rules-standards continuum illustrates that law
need not consist only of determinate logical rules or freewheeling discretionary standards;
many legal doctrines combine aspects of both. Concept models using prototypes and
exemplars help explain how those doctrines do so, how they can be flexible but not
unbounded, structured but not rigid. While concept models do not resolve the rulesstandards dialectic, they do identify patterns of decision making and doctrinal form that,
well deployed, can capture the strengths of both rules and standards. 140
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different pattern of decisionmaking. As I argue in chapter 6, much of the perceived indeterminacy of
law results from the superimposition of a rationalist model for law upon a much more complex process
of human reasoning.
Id. at 11; see also Solan, supra note 94, at 468±71.
141. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
142. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124±26 (1945).
143. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
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Very well, one might say, concept models and categories have their place in the law,
and they can be useful for understanding some legal doctrines. But why this place? How
do they help us understand appealability? I believe they are both descriptively and
normatively helpful. They add an important dimension to our description of the federal
appealability doctrines. And they can provide normative guidance for future doctrinal
development where the current appealability doctrines are in flux.
An understanding of categories and concepts helps describe the present state and the
history of the federal appealability doctrines. A description of the appealability doctrines
should also be able to describe how they change over time and how judges actually decide
cases. As explained further below, those doctrinal changes²and many of the unspoken
judicial decisions²happen at the initial categorical step. The categorical approach
accounts for the initial categorization question and the two-step process for deciding
appealability. It also supplements and clarifies the one-dimensional rules-standards
continuum. Additionally, the categorical approach explains the judicial and scholarly
dissatisfaction with the doctrine of finality.
Take, for example, the typical complaints about the final-judgment rule and the idea
of finality: that it is hard to define, that it is fuzzy with borderline cases. These criticisms
echo the shortcomings of the classical categorical view (or, put another way, they reflect
the mismatch between the idea of finality and the classical categorical form). The
FRPSODLQW WKDW WKHUH LV ³>Q@R YHUEDO IRUPXOD´ IRU ILQDOLW\ 141 reflects the fact that radial
categories elude definition and are graded (with more typical members more strongly
resembling WKH FHQWUDO SURWRW\SHV DQG H[HPSODUV  7KH REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW ³DSSHDODEOH
ILQDOLW\KDVDSHQXPEUDODUHD´142 RUD³WZLOLJKW]RQH´143 echoes the way radial categories
are fuzzy with marginal members that are equally similar to negative prototypes and
exemplars. As explained further below, that is because finality is not a purely rational idea
defined by a classical category, it is a radial concept. For a description to capture the
contours of a concept like finality-for-appeal, not to mention describing what courts have
actually been doing, it needs to consider the categorical dimension.
The conceptual approach can also provide normative guidance when it comes to
appealability, suggesting potential directions for doctrinal reform, particularly about
finality-for-appeal. First, the conceptual approach calls into question the efficacy and
GHVLUDELOLW\ RI WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V FXUUHQW HIIRUWV WR FDELQ MXGLFLDO LQQRYDWLRQ 7KH
inevitability of a categorical step in any appealability decision, along with the historical
evidence that judges and parties will reshape categories to meet perceived needs, means
that an edict directing judges to decide finality-for-appeal issues categorically (without
further guidance as to how to formulate categories) will not meaningfully limit the
innovations around the idea of finality. It will only lead to more circumlocutory
interpretations and innovations, and more costly litigation to try to fix the fuzzy boundaries
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of various categories. Second, a conceptual approach that acknowledged the inevitability
of categorical flexibility but channeled judicial innovation through conceptual categories
would be superior to an ineffective ban on judicial reinterpretation of the finality-forappeal doctrines. If the Court provided more conceptual guidance, without trying to shut
down innovation entirely, it would encourage the continued development of the finalityfor-appeal doctrines, including eventually enabling their solidification into classically
defined categories and clear rules.
IV. MAPPING APPEALABILITY DOCTRINES BY CATEGORY TYPE
The traditional rules-standards continuum in Figure 1 can be expanded by adding a
categorical dimension. As explained, each appealability doctrine has two steps: a
categorization step and an application step. The rules-standard continuum focuses on the
second step, arranging the appealability doctrines horizontally by the extent to which they
resemble rules or standards. Figure 2, below, adds a second dimension, arranging each
doctrine vertically by the extent to which it employs a classical or conceptual category at
the first step.

1. Classical Rules: Final Judgments, Injunctions, and Receiverships
Classical appealability rules use bright-line rules to always permit immediate

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

A. Doctrines Using Classical Categories
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This Part (IV) examines the exemplary doctrines in each quadrant, beginning with
the Classical Rules in the upper right quadrant and proceeding counterclockwise around
the matrix to discuss Classical Standards and Conceptual Standards. The next Part (V)
discusses the finality-for-appeal doctrines that developed as interpretations of § ¶V
final-judgment rule and how they use concept models of finality.
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appeals, but only from classically defined categories of orders. For a court to find an order
DSSHDODEOHXQGHUDFODVVLFDOFDWHJRULFDOUXOHWKHFRXUWQHHGRQO\DVN³GRHVWKLVRUGHUILW
LQWRDGHILQHGFDWHJRU\"´²if it does, then the rule provides that the order is immediately
appealable.
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1291: final judgments
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144. 28 U.S.C. § 6HFWLRQDOVRSURYLGHVIRUSDUWLFXODUFDVHVZKHUH³GLUHFWreview may be had in the
6XSUHPH&RXUW´Id.
145. See, e.g., 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at §§ 3905±14; GREGORY A. CASTANIAS &
ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 71 (2d ed. 2017).
146. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962).
147. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, c.20, §§ 7KH-XGLFLDU\$FW¶VILQDOLW\SURYLVLRQGHULYHGIURP
the practice of English common law courts. 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3906. For
unclear reasons, the first Judiciary Act applied this final decision requirement to case in both law and equity,
even though English practice allowed for interlocutory appeals in equity courts. Id.; see also Crick, supra note
42, at 540±44.
148. The Judiciar\$FWRI ³(YDUWV$FW´ $FWRI0DUFK6WDWPF 6.
149. Judgment, BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan Garner ed., WKHG  ³$FRXUW¶VILQDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
RIWKHULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVRIWKHSDUWLHVLQDFDVH´ Final judgment is ³>D@ FRXUW¶VODVWDFWLRQWKDWVHWWOHVWKH
rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes,
DWWRUQH\¶VIHHV DQGHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHMXGJPHQW´ 7KH)HGHUDO5XOHVRI&LYLO3URFHGXUHGHILQH³MXGJPHQW´
VRPHZKDWXQKHOSIXOO\IRUWKHVHSXUSRVHVDV³DGHFUHHDQGDQ\RUGHUIURPZKLFKDQDSSHDOOLHV´FED. R. CIV. P.
54(a).
150. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a). Rule 58(a) also provides that certain other orders function as judgments but do not
require a separate document.
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When it comes to appealability, the quintessential classical rule is § ¶Vso-called
³ILQDO-MXGJPHQW UXOH´ ZKLFK JLYHV IHGHUDO DSSHDOV FRXUWV MXULVGLFWLRQ WR KHDU ³DSSHDOV
IURPDOOILQDOGHFLVLRQVRIWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWV´ 144 Formally, the final-judgment rule is a
simple if-then rule: if a decision is final, then it is immediately appealable. When applied
to the formal final judgments discussed in this section, it is a classical rule, using a classical
categorical definition (reinforced by procedural requirements) of finality. In practice,
when applied in the finality-for-appeal doctrines discussed below in Part V, it is a
conceptual rule, using conceptual categories to determine finality.
Most descriptions of the federal appealability doctrines start with the final-judgment
rule.145 $QG LW KDV EHHQ FDOOHG WKH ³FRUQHUVWRQH´ RI DOO WKH IHGHUDO DSSHDODELOLW\
doctrines.146 ,WVRULJLQVFDQEHWUDFHGWRWKH-XGLFLDU\$FWRI¶VSURYLVLRQIRUDSSHDOV
IURPIHGHUDOWULDOFRXUWV¶³ILQDOGHFUHHV´DQG³ILQDOMXGJPHQWV´147 When Congress created
the circuit courts of appeals in 1891, it granted them appellate jurisdiction over those same
ILQDOGHFUHHVQRZFDOOHG³ILQDOGHFLVLRQ>V@´148
A formal final judgment is the traditional end of the trial-court stage of a case, when
WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW HQWHUV LWV GHILQLWLYH UXOLQJ RQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ ULJKWV DQG REOLJDWLRQV DQG
dispenses with the entire case.149 For formal final judgments, the boundary defining a final
judgment is marked by a procedural requirement: only entry of the judgment on the docket
triggers the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal.150 Indeed, as the idea of
finality has grown fuzzier, the procedural requirement for formal final judgments has
become clearer: In 1958, Rule 58(a) was amended to require the district court or clerk to
enter a judgment on the docket as a separate document. 151 Later, Rule 58(c) was added to
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direct that, if the court has not entered a separate document, the judgment is deemed
entered 150 days after the final order was entered.152 These procedural requirements
definitively establish what counts as a formal final judgment. That certainty allows for the
final-judgment rule to operate as a classical categorical rule, at least in that specific
instance: if a decision meets those procedural requirements, then it is immediately
appealable, regardless of the specific facts or circumstances of the given case.
b. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (2)
Sections 1292(a)(1) and (2) are also classical categorical rules; each uses a classical
definition to establish a specific category of orders (orders affecting injunctions and
receiverships) that is immediately appealable.153
Section 1292 owes its origin to perception that strict enforcement of the finaljudgment rule was sometimes unjust or inefficient. In the mid-nineteenth century, the
Court began to experiment with more flexible interpretations of the rule, giving rise to
some of the fuzzier finality-for-appeal doctrines discussed below. 154 Toward the end of
the century, Congress stepped in, drafting new rule-like exceptions to the final-judgment
rule.155 In 1891, Congress passed the first version of § 1292, granting the newly created
FLUFXLWFRXUWVDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQRYHULPPHGLDWHDSSHDOVIURPWULDOFRXUW³interlocutory
order[s] or decree[s] granting or continuing . . . LQMXQFWLRQ>V@´156 Congress was motivated
E\ WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW ³ULJLG DSSOLFDWLRQ´ RI WKH ILQDO-MXGJPHQW UXOH ³FUHDWH>G@ XQGXH
KDUGVKLSLQVRPHFDVHV´ZKHQLQMXQFWLRQVZRXOGKDYHLPPHGLDWHHIIHFWV 157 Over time,
the rule was modified for similar reasons, and the current incarnation, 28 U.S.C.
§  D   FRYHUV RUGHUV ³JUDQWLQJ FRQWLQXLQJ PRGLI\LQJ UHIXVLQJ RU GLVVROYLQJ
LQMXQFWLRQV´158
Section 1292(a)(2) originated through a similar process, 159 for similar reasons.160
In 1900, Congress passed the precursor161 to § 1292(a)(2), which now grants appellate
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152. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c).
153. Other classical categorical rules include the subject-specific appealability doctrines found in specific
statutes like the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
154. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see generally 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 55, at § 3910.
155. See Dreutzer v. Frankfort Land Co., 65 F. 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1895) (noting that section 7 of the Act of
1891, the predecessor to § 1292(a)(1)³LQWURGXFHGLQWRIHGHUDODSSHOODWHSURFHGXUHDQRYHOW\´ 
156. 7KH-XGLFLDU\$FWRI ³(YDUWV$FW´ $FWRI0DUFK6WDW 7.
157. Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (citing Balt. Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176,
180±81 (1955)). ³1R GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH XQGHUO\LQJ UHDVRQV IRU PRGLI\LQJ WKH UXOH RI ILQDOLW\ DSSHDUV LQ WKH
legislative history, although the changes seem plainly to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to
HIIHFWXDOO\FKDOOHQJHLQWHUORFXWRU\RUGHUVRIVHULRXVSHUKDSVLUUHSDUDEOHFRQVHTXHQFH´ Balt. Contractors, 348
U.S. at 181.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). For more detailed history of the revisions to § 1292(a)(1), see Carson, 450 U.S.
at 83±84 n.8; Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829±30 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly,
J., dissenting).
159. For legislative history, see 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3925 (3d ed. 2008).
160. Id. ³7KHSXUSRVHRIDOORZLQJLQWHUORFXWRU\DSSHDOVIURP>UHFHLYHUVKLS@RUGHUVLVVLPLODUWRWKHSXUSRVH
XQGHUO\LQJLQMXQFWLRQDSSHDOV´ .
161. Act of June 6, 1900, c. 620, 31 Stat. 660. Before it was codified as part of § 1292, the precursor rule
appeared in § 129 of the Judicial Code of 1911, which provided:
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MXULVGLFWLRQRYHULQWHUORFXWRU\GHFLVLRQVRUGHUV³appointing receivers, or refusing orders
to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as
dirHFWLQJVDOHVRURWKHUGLVSRVDOVRISURSHUW\´ 162
As with the final-judgment rule itself, there remains some ambiguity about which
orders §§ 1292(a)(1) and (2) cover (which orders sufficiently involve injunctions and
receiverships). The Supreme Court has carefully policed the reach of § 1292, approaching
LW³VRPHZKDWJLQJHUO\OHVWDIORRGJDWHEHRSHQHG´WKDWDOORZVWRRPDQ\DSSHDOV 163 The
end result is that, for both of these categories of orders, § 1292(a) operates as a rule
allowing an immediate appeal, with no provision for the exercise of judicial discretion
based on the specific facts or circumstances of the given case.

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

Where, upon a hearing in a district court, or by a judge thereof, in vacation, . . . an interlocutory order
or decree is made appointing a receiver, or refusing an order to wind up a pending receivership or to
take the appropriate steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing a sale or other disposal
of property held thereunder, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree to the
circuit court of appeals.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (emphasis added).
163. Switz. &KHHVH$VV¶Q,QFY(+RUQH¶V0NW., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966).
164. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1242 ³>8@QGHU WKHSUHYDLOLQJMXGLFLDO GRFWULQHVQR LQWHUORFXWRU\ WULDO
court order is categorically beyond an appellate FRXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ´ 
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2).
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These classical categorical rules have certain traits in common. First, they illustrate
something that is true of all the appealability rules (including, as shown below, conceptual
categorical rules): they create a right to appeal. That is to say, when an appealability
GRFWULQH HPSOR\V D UXOH WKDW UXOH LV DOZD\V ³LI the decision is in the category, then an
DSSHDO LV SHUPLWWHG´ 7KHUH DUH QR categorical rules barring appeals. Although some
categories of orders, like discovery orders, rarely give rise to immediate appeals, there is
no rule that they are never immediately appealable.164 Even a discovery order could be
appealable if it also fit into a category from which another doctrine permits an appeal.
Second, the classical rules illustrate that classical and conceptual categories are
relative, not absolute²they mark the ends of a continuum. And their history shows that
the positions of doctrines along that continuum are not fixed²they change over time.
Centuries of attorneys and judges motivated to allow or disallow particular appeals have
WHDVHG RXW DPELJXLWLHV WR EOXU WKH GHILQLWLRQV RI ³ILQDO´ ³LQMXQFWLRQ´ DQG ³UHFHLYHU´
pushing classical categories more toward the conceptual end of the continuum. In
response, rule-makers have revised and added rules, and the Court has cabined
interpretations to move them more toward classical categorical clarity. (Indeed, the trace
of a similarity-based conceptual category can be found in §  D  ¶V description of
³RUGHUV. . . to take steps to accomplish the purposes [of receiverships], such as directing
VDOHV RU RWKHU GLVSRVDOV RI SURSHUW\´165 Rather than identifying every necessary and
sufficient characteristic of an order that serves the purpose of a receivership, the definition
identifies two exemplars and trusts judges to recognize which orders are similar to those).
Third, the classical rules illustrate two ways that rule-makers and courts try to create
classical categorical clarity. The evolution of § 1292 demonstrates a definition-writing
technique: adding words and clarifications to a category description to better describe the
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category it defines. The development of Rule 58 demonstrates a proceduralizing technique:
rather than revising the § ¶VGHILQLWLRQRI³ILQDO´LWLPSRVHVDQDUWLILFLDOSURFHGXUDO
requirement and uses that as a bright-line.
2. Classical Standards: Partial Final Judgments and Class Certification Orders
Classical appealability standards use discretionary standards to sometimes (on a
case-by-case basis) permit immediate appeals, but only from classically defined categories
of orders. For a court to find an order appealable under a classical categorical standard, the
FRXUWPXVWILUVWDVN³GRHVWKLVRUGHUILWLQWRDGHILQHGFDWHJRU\"´²and, if it does, must
WKHQDVN³VKRXOGWKLVVSHFLILFRUGHUEHDSSHDODEOHXQGHUWKHDSSOLFDEOHVWDQGDUG"´
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) permits immediate appeals from partial final
judgments, and Rule 23(f) permits applications for permission to appeal from class
certification orders. They both explicitly employ the two-step appealability decisionmaking process, and they are both classical categorical appealability standards.
a. Rule 54(b)
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166. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511±13 (1950) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b));
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) was actually pURPXOJDWHGDQGDPHQGHGSXUVXDQWWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VJHQHUDO
rulemaking authority, before the 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) which would seem to specifically
authorize it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b), advisory committee¶V notes to 1946 and 1961 amendments. Rule 54(b)
was amended again in 1961 to clarify that it applies when a court disposes of a party in a multi-party case, just
as it applies when a court disposes of a claim in a multi-claim case. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 DGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHH¶V
notes to 1961 amendments.
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 54.
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 DGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHH¶VQRWHVWRDPHQGPHQW
169. Id. ³5XOH  E  ZDV RULJLQDOO\ DGRSWHG LQ YLHZ RI WKH ZLGH VFRSH DQGSRVVLEOe content of the newly
FUHDWHGµFLYLODFWLRQ¶ in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim
WRDZDLWDGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHHQWLUHFDVH´).
170. Id. 5XOH  E  ZDV DFWXDOO\ SURPXOJDWHG DQG DPHQGHG SXUVXDQW WR WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V JHQHUDO
rulemaking authority, before the 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) which would seem to specifically
authorize it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) DGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHH¶VQRWHVWRDQGDPHQGPHQWV
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Rule 54(b) allows an immediate appeal from a partial final judgment²an
LQWHUORFXWRU\UXOLQJWKDWUHVROYHVWKHPHULWVRI³RQHRUPRUHEXWIHZHUWKDQDOOFODLPVRU
SDUWLHV´ LQ D PXOWL-claim case²EXW RQO\ LI WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW ³H[SUHVVO\ determines that
WKHUH LV QR MXVW UHDVRQ IRU GHOD\´ LQ HQWHULQJ MXGJPHQW166 Thus, Rule 54(b) explicitly
requires a two-step process. First, the district court must determine whether a given order
falls into the category of orders eligible to be partial final judgments: orders in a multiclaim
FDVHWKDWUHVROYHDOORIDFODLPRUDOORIDSDUW\¶VFODLPV6HFRQGWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWPXVW
GHFLGHZKHWKHUWKHUHLV³QRMXVWUHDVRQIRUGHOD\´LQHQWHULQJWKHMXGJPHQW 167 The first
step employs a classical categorical definition, the second a standard. And that is no
accident²it was a deliberate innovation when Rule 54(b) was amended in 1946. 168
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include liberal joinder provisions
allowing federal courts to hear complex cases, the original drafters of the Rules felt that a
more liberal appealability doctrine was needed. 169 The solution was Rule 54(b).170 The
first version of Rule 54(b) authorized district courts to enter appealable partial final
judgments, if they found that an interlocXWRU\ UXOLQJ GHFLGHG ³WKH LVVXHV PDWHULDO WR D
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171. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432±34 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)).
172. FED. R. CIV. P. DGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHH¶VQRWH to 1946 amendment.
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1946); FED. R. CIV. P. DGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHH¶VQRWHWRDPHQGPHQW. Rule
54(b) was amended again in 1961 to clarify that it applies when a court disposes of a party in a multi-party case,
just as it applies when a court disposes of a claim in a multi-claim case. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 advisory comPLWWHH¶V
note to 1961 amendment.
174. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 434±36; Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng¶r & Foundry Co., 351 U.S.
445, 449±53 (1956).
175. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 435, 437 (noting in passing that the validity of the original version of the
5XOHZDV³QRORQJHUTXHVWLRQHG´ 
176. Id. at 436; see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7   ³$GLVWULFWFRXUWPXVWILUVW
GHWHUPLQHWKDWLWLVGHDOLQJZLWKDµILQDOMXGJPHQW¶,WPXVWEH a µMXGJPHQW¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWLVDGHFLVLRQXSRQ
DFRJQL]DEOHFODLPIRUUHOLHIDQGLWPXVWEHµILQDO¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWLVµDQXOWLPDWHGLVSRVLWLRn of an individual
FODLPHQWHUHGLQWKHFRXUVHRIDPXOWLSOHFODLPVDFWLRQ¶´  TXRWLQJSears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 436).
177. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 435; Cold Metal Process, 351 U.S. at 452±53.
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particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which
LVWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIWKHFODLP´171 For the first time district courts had explicit authority
to determine whether a given order should be considered final and appealable.
That version proved unwieldy because it was hard to tell which issues were
VXIILFLHQWO\³PDWHULDOWRDSDUWLFXODU>GHFLGHG@FODLP´DQGVXIILFLHQWO\VHSDUDWHIURPRWKHU
undecided issues and claims, to warrant immediate appeal.172 It was too fuzzy a standard
for consistent adjudication. But a strict bright-line rule would not achieve the flexibility
that was the original impetus for the Rule. Therefore, in 1946, the Rule was amended to
clarify that district courts could enter appealable partial final judgments only when an
LQWHUORFXWRU\RUGHUGHFLGHG³RQHRUPRUHEXWOHVVWKDQDOORIWKHFODLPV´DQGRQO\LIWKH
GLVWULFWFRXUW PDGH D VHSDUDWHH[SOLFLWGHWHUPLQDWLRQ WKDWWKHUH ZDV ³QRMXVWUHDVRQIRU
GHOD\´ in entering judgment.173 The new version broke the appealability inquiry into two
steps, providing initial rule-like clarity (was a claim decided?) while preserving room for
case-by-case standard (is there a just reason for delay?) answerable to the needs of justice.
A pair of cases decided together in 1956, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey and Cold
Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., illustrate how Rule 54(b)
crystallized into a two-step, classical categorical standard.174 The question before the
Court in both cases was whether the amended Rule 54 was consistent with § ¶VILQDOjudgment rule. If it were not, the Rule amendment would be impermissible, because
Congress had not yet granted the Court authority to write rules declaring non-final orders
appealable.
In Sears, Roebuck, Justice Burton, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the
DPHQGHG  YHUVLRQ RI 5XOH  E  GLG QRW ³UHOD[´ § ¶V ILQDO-decision
requirement.175 The majority held that a decision resolving an entire claim was final as to
that claim.176 Accordingly, the Court held in Sears, Roebuck that a partial judgment on
two of six claims was immediately appealable, and it held in Cold Metal Process that a
partial judgment on a counterclaim was immediately appealable. 177 Pointing to the history
of the Rule and the 1946 amendment, the majority opinion treated the decides-a-claim
requirement as a necessary and sufficient feature to both define the category of decisions
VXEMHFW WR 5XOH  E  DQG GHHP WKHP ³ILQDO´ 7KDW GHFLVLon could be understood as a
prototype model of finality, reasoning that decisions deciding entire claims were enough
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like prototypical final decisions that they should be categorized as final. 178 But the
majority did not adopt a prototype model. Instead, using the decides-a-claim requirement
as a necessary-and-sufficient condition, the Court created a category with a classical
definition. And so, the first step of the analysis²categorizing a decision as a final
judgment²became the application of a classical definition, while the second step²
determining whether there was just reason for delay in the case²remained a case-by-case
standard. Thus, 54(b) became a classical categorical standard.
In his dissenting and concurring opinions, Justice Frankfurter objected that the
PDMRULW\¶V holding could not be squared with the prior understanding of finality.
Frankfurter would have held instead that a decision was final only if it comported with the
³GHHSO\ URRWHG´ DQG ³ZLGHO\ VDQFWLRQHG SULQFLSOH´ DW WKH ³FRUH´ RI § 1291 ³WKDW WKHUH
VKRXOGEHQRSUHPDWXUHLQWHUPHGLDWHDSSHDO´QR³SLHFHPHDODSSHDOV´²meaning that even
a fully decided claim had to be separable from the remainder of the case before it could be
considered final.179 )UDQNIXUWHU SURWHVWHG WKDW WKH PDMRULW\¶V LQVLstence that § ¶V
ILQDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQW³UHPDLQ>HG@XQLPSDLUHG´UDQJKROORZDQGWKDWILQDOLW\XQGHU§ 1291
ZDVQRORQJHU³ZKDWLWZDVEHIRUHWKHVHRSLQLRQVZHUHZULWWHQ´ 180
7KH PDMRULW\¶V DQG )UDQNIXUWHU¶V RSLQLRQV UHIOHFWHG GLIIHUHQW YLHZV RI WKH
categorical nature of the final-judgment rule. While Frankfurter would have treated finality
under § 1291 as a conceptual category, based on a particular purpose and a prototypical
³GHHSO\URRWHG´³FRUH´SULQFLSOHWKHPDMRULW\WUHDWHGLWOLNHDFODVVLFDOO\GHIined category
with ascertainable boundaries.181

The Court could have said that Rule 54(b), promulgated under congressional authority and having the
force of statute, has qualified 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It does not say so. The Court could have said that it
rejects the reasoning of the decisions in which this Court for over a century has interpreted § 1291 as
expressing a hostility toward piecemeal appeals. It does not say so. The Court could have said that
5XOH E ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWRIDFHUWLILFDWHIURPDGLVWULFWMXGJHPHDQVWKDWWKHGLVWULFWMXGJHVDORQH
determine the content of finality. The Court does not say that either.
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Id.
181. Id. at 441. Arguably, what Frankfurter would have done explicitly²treated § 1291 as a prototypical
category and asked whether rulings under 54(b) were enough like the prototype at the center of § 1291 to be
considered final²the majority did implicitly. Instead of acknowledging that it was treating orders subject to Rule
54(b) like final decisions, the majority insisted that they actually are final decisions. As discussed below, the
IOH[LEOH ³ILQDO GHFLVLRQ´ FDWHJRU\ VXUYLYHG WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ WKDW )UDQNIXUWHU ZDV SURWHVWLQJ EHFDXVH WKDW
category was never a strictly defined classical category, and it continued to be understood in an essentially
prototypical manner.
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178. In order to make this declaration, the Court recharacterized the prior understanding of finality as merely
D³IRUPHUgeneral practice that, in multiple claim actions, all the claims had to be finally decided before an
DSSHDOFRXOGEHHQWHUWDLQHGIURPDILQDOGHFLVLRQXSRQDQ\RIWKHP´Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 434 (emphasis
added). The Court then H[SODLQHG WKDW 5XOH  E  KDG UHOD[HG WKLV ³JHQHUDO SUDFWLFH´ QRW WKH ILQDO-decision
requirement itself. Id. at 436.
179. Id. at 441 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For Frankfurter, courts making that determination had to apply a
³VHSDUDWH-and-LQGHSHQGHQWWHVW´WRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDJLYHQUXOLQJGHFLGHGDWUXO\VHSDUDEOHLVVXHRUZKHWKHU
LWZDVWUXO\WKHQRQDSSHDODEOHSDUW³RIDQRUJDQLFZKROH´Id. at 443±44. Years later, in Curtiss-Wright, the Court
reintroduced the separability concerns that motivated Frankfurter, holding that separability was a permissible
consideration in the second part of the Rule 54(b) certification process, when determining that there was no just
reason for delay. 446 U.S. at 8.
180. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter listed various ways the Court
could have acknowledged and explained the contradiction between Rule 54(b) and the prior conception of
finality:
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182. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
183. Id.
184. An influential early Rule 23(f) case by Judge Easterbrook identified three non-exclusive considerations:
ZKHWKHUWKHGHQLDORIFODVVFHUWLILFDWLRQZRXOGEHWKHHIIHFWLYH³GHDWKNQHOO´RIWKHFDVHZKHWKHUDJUDQWRIFODVV
certification would exert undue pressure to settle; and whether permitting an appeal would advance the
development of the law. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999). Other courts have
largely followed suit. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 159, at § 3931.1 n.14.
185. FED. R. CIV. P  I DGYLVRU\FRPPLWWHH¶VQRWHWRDPHQGPHQWsee 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
186. 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3912.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978).
190. Id. at 473±75. For a discussion of discretionary interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b), see infra Part
IV.B.1.
191. In the 1990s, Congress granted the Supreme Court explicit rulemaking authority to make previously
unappealable orders appealable. First, in 1990, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 et
seqWRDXWKRUL]HWKH&RXUWWRDGRSWUXOHV³GHILQ>LQJ@ZKHQDUXOLQJRIDGLVWULFWFRXUWLVILQDOIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI
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Like Rule 54(b), Rule 23(f) uses a two-step, classical categorical standard, applying
a standard to a defined category of orders, namely orders granting or denying class
certification.182 )DFHGZLWKVXFKDQRUGHUDSDUW\PD\ILOHD³SHWLWLRQIRUSHUPLVVLRQWR
DSSHDO´DQGWKHDSSHOODWHFRXUW³PD\SHUPLW´WKHDSSHDO183 Rule 23(f) provides no criteria
for when the appellate court should grant an appeal (although courts have identified some
non-exclusive factors to consider).184 The upshot is that class certification orders are
eligible for appeal, but only if the appellate court determines, on a discretionary, case-bycase basis, that an appeal is warranted.
Because Rule 23(f) was enacted pursuant to explicit statutory authority allowing the
&RXUWWRGHILQH³ILQDOLW\´WKURXJKUXOHPDNLQJLWGRHVQRWUDLVHWKHVDPHTXHVWLRQVDERXW
compatibility with § 1291 as Rule 54(b).185 But its origins illustrate that same tension. In
the 1960s, appellate courts began to experiment with a new finality-for-appeal doctrine in
FODVV DFWLRQV WKH ³GHDWK-NQHOO GRFWULQH´ ZKLFK DOORZHG LPPHGLDWH DSSHDOV IURP RUGHUV
granting or denying class certification in class action cases. 186 The courts reasoned that,
because class-certification grants often spurred settlement and class-certification denials
often prompted plaintiffs to drop their cases, 187 the certification decision often sounded
WKH³GHDWKNQHOO´IRUWKHFDVHEXWLWGLGQRWUHVXOWLQDQDSSHDODEOHMXGJPHQW 188 So the
cRXUWVGHYHORSHGD³GHDWKNQHOOGRFWULQH´DOORZLQJIRUGLVFUHWLRQDU\LPPHGLDWHDSSHDOV
when a class-certification order would likely induce a party to give up before final
judgment.
In 1978, the Supreme Court put a stop to this relaxation of the final-judgment rule
in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay(PSKDVL]LQJWKDWWKHFRVWVWRV\VWHPLFHIILFLHQF\ ³WKH
LPSDFW RI VXFK DQ LQGLYLGXDOL]HG MXULVGLFWLRQDO LQTXLU\ RQ WKH MXGLFLDO V\VWHP¶V RYHUDOO
FDSDFLW\ WR DGPLQLVWHU MXVWLFH´  ³RXWZHLJKHG´ WKH EHQHILWV RI LQGLYLdual fairness
³HQKDQF>LQJ@WKHTXDOLW\RIMXVWLFHDIIRUGHGDIHZOLWLJDQWV´ WKH&RXUWKHOGVXFKRUGHUV
unappealable.189 Instead, the Court urged courts to use their discretion under § 1292(b) to
permit interlocutory appeals of class certification orders. 190
Using § 1292(b), however, proved ineffective, and the Court used its rulemaking
power191 in 1998 to adopt Rule 23(f) allowing parties to petition for immediate appeal
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from class certification orders.192 Rule 23(f) does not create a right to appeal from a class
certification decision. It merely permits a party to ask the appellate court for permission to
DSSHDO7KHUXOHVFRPPLWWHHHPSKDVL]HGWKDW5XOH I JLYHVWKHFRXUWVRIDSSHDOV³VROH´
³XQIHWWHUHGGLVFUHWLRQZKHWKHUWRSHUPLWWKHDSSHDODNLQWRWKHGLVcretion exercised by the
6XSUHPH&RXUWLQDFWLQJRQDSHWLWLRQIRUFHUWLRUDUL´193 Although the committee expected
the courts of appeals to develop appealability standards to guide their discretion, it did not
impose any.194
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appeal under VHFWLRQ´ F 7KHQLQ&RQJUHVVIXUWKHUDXWhorized the Court to prescribe rules
DOORZLQJDSSHDOVIURP³LQWHUORFXWRU\GHFLVLRQ>V@´XQGHU 1292. 28 U.S.C. §  H  ³7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWPD\
prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision
WRWKHFRXUWVRIDSSHDOVWKDWLVQRWRWKHUZLVHSURYLGHGIRUXQGHUVXEVHFWLRQ D  E  F RU G ´ )HGHUDO&RXUWV
Administration Act of 1992, PL 102±572, October 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4506.
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
193. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee¶V notes to 1998 amendment.
194. Id. The committee suggested some considerations (whether a certification order would end a particular
case and whether the case presented novel questions). Id. The courts have largely followed those suggestions,
while developing their own variations on the standard to apply. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 159,
at § 3931.1 nn.9, 14.
195. See Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714±15 (2017).
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Both Rule 54(b) and Rule 23(f)²the Rules using classical categorical standards²
reflect the judicial understanding, developed through years of institutional experience, that
purely categorical rules fail to meet the efficiency and fairness goals of the appealability
doctrines: there are categories of decisions that are sometimes, but not always, worth
immediately appealing. Therefore, these Rules use bright-line procedural mechanisms to
obtain the either/or certainty as to whether an order fits a category. But they also enjoy the
flexibility of standards, which can be applied on a discretionary, case-by-case basis. The
strict classical categories clear a (limited) space for the courts to employ the discretionary
standards. By limiting the categories of orders to which the standards apply, these classical
categorical standards limit the risk of freewheeling judicial caprice posed by pure
discretionary standards. They also allow for courts to develop more specialized standards.
The standard for deciding appealability within each category can be different, and over
time the standards can be tailored to the particular kinds of orders to which judges think
they should apply.
Classical categorical standards do not have to be rules of procedure (rather than
statutes or case law), but it is not surprising that these two are found in the Federal Rules.
The rulemaking process can leverage judicial institutional knowledge to identify
categories of decisions that could benefit from applying an appealability standard, and it
can then fix those categories with classical definitions and procedural markers setting their
limits.195 Placing the requirement in the Federal Rules creates a procedural bright line:
either the district court has entered a partial final judgment or it has not; either it has entered
a class certification order or it has not. That procedural clarity reinforces the definitional
boundaries of the classical categories.
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B. Doctrines Using Conceptual Categories
1. Conceptual Standards: Interlocutory Orders
Not all categories of orders that should sometimes be appealable are fixed or easily
defined. That is where 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) comes into play. Aside from the appellate
mandamus doctrine²which is best considered an exception to or safety valve from the
appealability doctrines196²the most flexible of the appealability doctrines is § 1292(b),
and it employs something like a conceptual standard. Conceptual standards are the most
amorphous of the appealability doctrines, combining the fuzziness of conceptual
categories with the flexibility of standards.
Conceptual appealability standards use discretionary standards to sometimes (on a
case-by-case basis) permit immediate appeal, but only from conceptually constituted
categories of orders. For a court to find an order appealable under a conceptual categorical
VWDQGDUGWKHFRXUWPXVWILUVWDVN³GRHVWKLVRUGHUILWLQWRDFRQFHSWXDOFDWHJRU\"´²and,
LILWGRHVPXVWWKHQDVN³VKRXOGWKLVVSHFLILFRUGHUEHDSSHDODEOHXQGHUWKHDSSOLFDEOH
VWDQGDUG"´
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): Interlocutory Orders
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196. The appellate mandamus doctrine permits a discretionary appeal²via petition for a writ of mandamus²
when a court of appeals determines that the vaguely defined, but quite limited, extraordinary-circumstances
standard has been met. Id. at 1708 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 108 (1967) (Black, J., concurring))
³>,Q@ H[WUDRUGLQDU\ FLUFXPVWDQFHV PDQGDPXV PD\ EH XVHG WR UHYLHZ DQ LQWHUORFXWRU\ RUGHU ZKLFK LV E\ QR
PHDQV µILQDO¶DQG WKXV DSSHDODEOH XQGHU IHGHUDO VWDWXWHV´  6RPHZKDWWDXWRORJLFDOO\, the doctrine permits an
appellate court to grant a writ of mandamus, and thus hear an appeal from an interlocutory order, when the
petitioner shows that: (1) it has no other adequate means of obtaining relief; (2) the right to issuance of the writ
LV³FOHDUDQGLQGLVSXWDEOH´DQG(3) LVVXLQJWKHZULWLV³DSSURSULDWHXQGHUWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV´&KHQH\Y8.S.
Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380±81 (2004) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S.
394, 403 (1976)). This vague, discretionary standard can be applied to any kind of order, unlike the appealability
doctrines, which apply only to certain categories of orders.
197. Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 929 (amended 1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
198. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 109 n.56 (2d
ed. 2011); see Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, 290 F. 2d 697, 702±03, n.12 (5th Cir. 1961) (noting that § 1292(b) ³ZDV
a judge-sought, judge-made, judge-VSRQVRUHGHQDFWPHQW´DQGGHVFULELQJWKHOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\ 
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
200. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 n.9 (1994).
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In 1958, Congress created § 1292(b)197 in response to judicial desire for flexibility
to alleviate the strict final-judgment rule.198 It permits a party to seek permission in the
appellate court to appeal from an interlocutory order, but only if the district court first
FHUWLILHV WKDW WKH RUGHU ³LQYROYHV D FRQWUROOLQJ TXHVWLRQ RI ODZ DV WR ZKLFK WKHUH LV
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of WKHOLWLJDWLRQ´199
If the district court makes that certification, then the appellate court decides whether
WRSHUPLWWKHDSSHDO7KDWFRXUWERWKUHYLHZVWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VFHUWLILFDWLRQGHFLVLRQDQG
decides de novo whether the issue should be immediately appealable.200 When doing the
former, the appellate court re-applies the standard applied by the district court. When doing
WKHODWWHUWKHFRXUWDSSOLHVDQHYHQPRUHGLVFUHWLRQDU\VWDQGDUGRIZKHWKHU³H[FHSWLRQDO
cirFXPVWDQFHV´ZDUUDQWDQLPPHGLDWHDSSHDO²and it can decide not to allow the appeal
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201. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) (quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d
1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1972)) ³>(@YHQLIWKHGLVWULFWMXGJHFHUWLILHVWKHRUGHUXQGHU(b), the appellant still
µhas the burden of persuading the court of appeals that exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the
basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.¶´ .
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
203. Id.; see 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 159, at § 3930 nn.24±25, 38±42.
204. %\³LQFRUUHFW´,PHDQ³OLNHO\WREHUHYHUVHG´-XGJHVPD\YHU\ZHOOPDNHGHFLVLRQVZKLFKWKH\EHOLHYH
are required by binding precedent, even if they believe they are incorrect on some other grounds. See, e.g., Berger
v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 795, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
205. Indeed, truly incorrect decisions that are contrary to controlling precedent are not certifiable under
§ 1292(b) because there is no grounds for disagreement on them. See, e.g., In re Miedzianowski, 735 F.3d 383,
384 (6th Cir. 2013) FLWLQJ.UDXVY%GRI&QW\5G&RPP¶UVIRU.HQW&W\)G th Cir. 1966))
³:KHUHRXUFLUFXLWKDVDQVZHUHGWKHTXHVWLRQWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWLVERXQGE\RXUSXEOLVKHGDXWKRULW\$QGVRDUH
we. Because there is governing precedent in this circuit that settles the issue at hand, Defendants cannot show
WKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\FLUFXPVWDQFHVVXFKWKDWDQLQWHUORFXWRU\DSSHDOVKRXOGEHJUDQWHG´ 
206. It would be a rare judge, indeed, who would happily opine that there is even a fifty percent chance that
her decision is wrong. And no judge would opine that it is more than fifty percent likely to be wrong²she would
simply decide the other way.
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for any reason including concerns about its own docket congestion. 201 Unlike the classical
categorical rules and standards discussed above, § 1292(b) employs a conceptual
categorical question at the first step, before applying a standard at the second.
Because the appellate court re-applies the same standard as the district court, the
steps are not split between the trial and appellate courts. The first-step categorization
questLRQLVWKHFRQWHVWDELOLW\LQTXLU\ZKHWKHUWKHUHLVD³VXEVWDQWLDOJURXQGIRUGLIIHUHQFH
RIRSLQLRQ´RQDTXHVWLRQRIODZZKLFKUHTXLUHVFRXUWVWRLGHQWLI\DFDWHJRU\RIFRQWHVWDEOH
legal questions.202 The second-step standard asks whether the question of law is
³FRQWUROOLQJ´ DQG ZKHWKHU DQ LPPHGLDWH DSSHDO ³PD\ PDWHULDOO\ DGYDQFH WKH XOWLPDWH
WHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH OLWLJDWLRQ´ ZKLFKDUHFDVH-specific determinations, dependent on the
nature and procedural posture of the particular case. 203
At the first step, there is no classical definition for what constitutes a contestable
question of law. Instead, courts use prototype- and exemplar-based reasoning to identify
contestable questions. The obvious prototype for a contestable decision is one that could
be reversed, an incorrect decision.204 But the category of contestable decisions must be
EURDGHU WKDQ MXVW LQFRUUHFW GHFLVLRQV EHFDXVH ³D VXEVWDQWLDO JURXQG IRU GLIIHUHQFH RI
RSLQLRQ´LVDEURDGHUGHVFULSWRUWKDQ³LQFRUUHFW´ 205 Still, one could imagine an intuitive
prototype-model centered on the idea of an incorrect decision²a graded category, where
decisions that are likely to be reversed fit the category better than those with little chance
of reversal. The problem with that prototype model lies in its implementation: It is hard to
require trial judges to assess their own likelihood of error, and even if they believe an error
is possible, they may be loath to declare it.206
It is not surprising, therefore, that an exemplar model has evolved to describe the
category of contestable decisions. The exemplars are other types of decisions with high
likelihoods of reversal. Courts have developed a rough graded category, where some of
the exemplars are considered more typical than others. Most courts recognize some
combination of the following exemplars (in roughly descending order of typicality):
(1) decisions contrary to holdings in other circuits; (2) decisions where there is a circuit
split on the question; (3) decisions where there is an intracircuit split at the district court
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level; (4) and decisions on novel questions of law.207
When an interlocutory decision resembles a more-typical exemplar (say, decisions
where there is a circuit split), courts often find it is a member of the category based on that
similarity alone.208 But when an interlocutory decision resembles only one of the lesstypical exemplars (say, decisions on novel questions of law), courts are more cautious,
often noting that something more is needed to fit the category. 209
Section 1292(b) demonstrates something interesting about the development of
categorical appealability doctrines: The more substantively open-ended a doctrine, the
more courts and rule-makers rely on procedural strictures to bound it. Section 1292(b) is
vague and discretionary at both the categorization and the standard-application steps.
Therefore, the procedural requirements are heightened. Both the trial court and the
appellate court have to agree that the doctrine applies, and the appellate court has to agree
to take the case. These procedural requirements serve as a backstop to the open-endedness
of the doctrine itself.210
That is why most of the exemplars of contestable decisions are defined by procedural
postures or outcomes²prior contrary holdings, circuit splits, etc. all depend on how other
courts have ruled in the past. Courts rely on the clear procedural signs of past contested
decisions to recognize the vague substantive category of contestable decisions. Put another
way, each of the exemplars is itself a category of decisions²but, like orders on injunctions
or partial final judgments, they are relatively clear, classical categories, constituted by
definitive procedural boundaries.
V. FINALITY-FOR-APPEAL: A QUASI-CLASSICAL AND A CONCEPTUAL CATEGORY

C M
Y K
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207. See, e.g., Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Suntrust Banks, Inc. ERISA
Litig., No. 08-CV-3384, 2011 WL 13824, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2011); City of Dearborn v. Comcast of
Michigan, Inc., No. 08-10156, 2008 WL 5084203, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2008); 2 BARBARA J. VAN
ARSDALE ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 3:218 (2019).
208. See, e.g., Tanasi v. New All. Bank, 786 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2015); Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 32
(1st Cir. 2008); Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Baker & Getty
Fin. Servs., Inc., 954 F.2d 1169, 1172 (6th Cir. 1992)
209. See, e.g., Couch, 611 F.3d at 633.
210. As a counterbalance to the open-ended, standard-like nature of § 1292(b), the doctrine does incorporate
some bright-OLQHUXOHVDQGSURFHGXUDOKXUGOHVWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VFHUWLILFDWLRQLVDEsolutely required; the time for
filing the petition for appeal after receiving the certification is short (ten days); and the district court order
declining to certify a decision for appeal is not, itself, appealable. See 20 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 198, at
§ 109 n.56; cf. In re Donald Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019) (using mandamus to direct the district court to
certify an immediate appeal under 1292(b)); see also Bryan Lammon, Appellate Jurisdiction in the Fourth
Circuit’s Emoluments Appeals, FINAL DECISIONS (July 10, 2019), https://finaldecisions.org/appellatejurisdiction-in-the-fourth-circuits-emoluments-appeals/ (arguing this is possibly an improper use of mandamus).
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When litigants seek (or appellate judges want to hear) an appeal that does not fit into
one of the established categories, either classical or categorical, they are left arguing (or
holding) that it should be considered final-for-appeal under § 1291. The finality-for-appeal
doctrines are different interpretations of the final-judgment rule that deem certain
categories of decisions final-for-appeal, even though they are neither formal final
judgments nor truly final decisions.
The finality-for-appeal doctrines each owe their origins to creative re-
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conceptualizing of the final-judgment rule²although some of them have now evolved into
quasi-classical categorical rules.
As explained above, the idea of finality-for-appeal is flexible: it resists clear
definitiRQ LW KDV ³>Q@R YHUEDO IRUPXOD´ 211 DQG KDV IX]]\ ERXQGDULHV D ³SHQXPEUDO
DUHD´212 RUD³WZLOLJKW]RQH´ 213 That is because finality-for-appeal is, at least originally,
a conceptual category. It can be modeled as a radial structure with positive and negative
prototypes and exemplars. As explained below, the central prototype anchoring the
concept of finality-for-appeal is the idea of the end the case.
While the final-judgment rule is a rule (if a decision is final, then it is immediately
appealable), the finality-for-appeal doctrines use that bright-line rule to always permit an
immediate appeal only from conceptually constituted categories of orders. For a court to
ILQGDQRUGHUDSSHDODEOHXQGHUWKHVHFRQFHSWXDODSSHDODELOLW\UXOHVLWPXVWDVN³GRHVWKLV
order fit into a conceptual cDWHJRU\"´²if it does, then the final-judgment rule provides
that the order is immediately appealable.
A. Quasi-Classical Categorical Rules: True Finality and the Collateral Order Doctrine
1. True Finality
Based on the prototype of formal final judgments, courts have long recognized
another category of orders²those that essentially end the case on the merits²that is also
considered final.214 That category of orders, those with so-FDOOHG³WUXHILQDOLW\´215 began
as a conceptual category and evolved into a quasi-classical one. It is now usually defined
using the famous formulation from Catlin v. United States: $ILQDOGHFLVLRQLV³JHQHUDOO\
one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the juGJPHQW´216 6XFK³WUXO\´ILQDOGHFLVLRQVDUHFRQVLGHUHGILQDOXQGHU§ 1291,
give rise to the right to appeal, and start the clock on the deadline for filing a notice of
appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a).217 Thus, the final-judgment rule operates on truly-final

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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211. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
212. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124±26 (1945).
213. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
214. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 299, 233 (1945).
215. See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1825±26.
216. Catlin, 324 U.S at 233. The Supreme Court alone has cited the Catlin formulation twenty-three times.
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1716 (2017); Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 408
(2015); Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int¶O Union of Operating Eng¶rs & Participating Emp¶rs,
571 U.S. 177 (2014); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int¶l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 690 (2010); Mohawk Indus.,
Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 116 (2009); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 79, 86 (2008); Green Tree Fin. Corp.Ala. v. Randolph, 539 U.S. 79, 86 (2000); Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999);
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 867 (1994); FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Invr¶s Mortg. Ins., 498 U.S. 269, 273 (1991); Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 522, 527 (1988); Budinich
v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485
U.S. 271, 275 (1988); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 374 (1987); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373±74 (1981); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S.
572, 580 (1980); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); Rederi A/B Disa v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
389 U.S. 852, 854 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 361 (1962); Balt. Contractors v.
Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 n.4 (1955); Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S. at 123±24 . The Courts of Appeals have cited
it hundreds more. See 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3910.
217. There are still open questions regarding whether certain other kinds of decisions should be considered are

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 40 Side B

05/15/2020 10:30:18

HEPPNER, R - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

5/6/2020 4:09 PM

434

[Vol. 55:395

TULSA LAW REVIEW

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

³WUXO\ILQDO´See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 30±36.
218. 6XEVHTXHQWFDVHVKDYHEOXUUHGWKHPHDQLQJRI³QRWKLQJ. . . WRGREXWH[HFXWHWKHMXGJPHQW´Catlin, 324
U.S. at 233, so that a decision can be considered truly final even if some issues (in addition to assessment of
FRVWV KDYH\HWWREHGHFLGHGLQFOXGLQJDWWRUQH\V¶IHHFODLPV Budinich, 486 U.S. at 198; Ray Haluch Gravel,
571 U.S. at 188±90); ministerial or technical damages calculations (Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note
24, at 26±27); or the claims of other parties in an MDL case (Gelboim, 574 U.S. at 415±17).
219. Craighead v. Wilson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 199, 201 (1855).
220. Whiting v. Bank of U.S., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 6, 15 (1839) ³This decision must have been made upon the
general ground, that a decree, final upon the merits of the controversy between the parties, is a decree upon which
a bill of review would lie, without and independent of any ulterior proceedings. Indeed, the ulterior proceedings
DUHEXWDPRGHRIH[HFXWLQJWKHRULJLQDOGHFUHHOLNHWKHDZDUGRIDQH[HFXWLRQDWODZ´) (discussing Ray v. Law,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 179 (1805)).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added).
222. Gelboim, 574 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added) (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233) (noting that § ¶V³core
application LVWRUXOLQJVWKDWWHUPLQDWHDQDFWLRQ´ 
223. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) (emphasis added).
224. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land in Town of Babylon, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942) (emphasis
added) (quoting Rubert Hermanos, Inc., v. People of P.R., 118 F.2d 752, 757 (1st Cir. 1941)).
225. Catlin, 324 U.S at 233.
226. 5D\+DOXFK*UDYHO&RY&HQW3HQVLRQ)XQGRI,QW¶O8QLRQRI2SHUDWLQJ(QJ¶rs & Participating Emp¶lrs,

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 40 Side B

decisions with nearly218 classical-categorical, rule-like clarity and predictability: If an
order decides the merits of the case, and the only thing that remains is executing the
judgment, then it is a truly final decision, and it is appealable under § 1291.
The classical Catlin definition of true finality evolved over time from a more
conceptual view of finality, based on the intuitive sense that some decisions that do not
end a case nonetheless look a lot like the end of a case (or a lot like a formal final judgment)
and should give rise to a right to appeal. Earlier cases sometimes express this looser
conceptual view. In the 1855 case Craighead v. Wilson, for example, the Court describes
a prior case, Whiting v. Bank of the United States, as holding that a decision was final
EHFDXVHLWKDG³DQHIIHFWVLPLODUWRWKDWRIDQH[HFXWLRQRQDMXGJPHQW´ 219 And the Court
in Whiting imagined that an even earlier case finding an interlocutory decree appealable
³must have been´ comparing the decree to a final judgment (despite never saying so).220
Today, the language used to describe finality still bears traces of this earlier
conceptual final-judgment-as-prototype thinking. Perhaps most obviously, although
§ 1291 granWV DSSHOODWH MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU ³ILQDO decisions RI WKH GLVWULFW FRXUWV´221 it is
FRPPRQO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³ILQDO-judgment UXOH´which functions as a reminder that its
³FRUH DSSOLFDWLRQ´ LV WR IRUPDO ILQDO MXGJPHQWV WKDW HQG FDVHV 222 Courts often use
metaphors to describe finality that highlight the centrality of final judgments to the
FRQFHSW7KH&RXUWKDVFDOOHGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIDILQDOMXGJPHQWWKH³cornerstone of the
VWUXFWXUH RIDSSHDOVLQWKH IHGHUDOFRXUWV´223 When deciding whether an order is final,
judges wonder how metaphorically close it is to a formal ILQDO MXGJPHQW ³µ$ ³ILQDO
GHFLVLRQ´ is not necessarily the ultimate judgment or decree completely closing up a
SURFHHGLQJ¶ But it is not easy to determine what decisions short of that point DUHILQDO´224
The Catlin GHILQLWLRQLWVHOIXVHVWKHZRUG³JHQHUDOO\´WRLQGLFDWHWKDWLWLVGHVFULELQJ
a typical final decision, thus suggesting both that the category of finality described could
be graded and its outer boundaries blurred.225 Likewise, when the Court cites Catlin, it
usually qualifies the definition by stating, for example, that it describes a final decision in
³WKHRUGLQDU\FRXUVH´226 RUWKDW³µILQDOGHFLVLRQV¶typically are ones that trigger the entry
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RI MXGJPHQW´227 Last year, in Hall v. Hall &KLHI -XVWLFH 5REHUWV VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH
archetypal final decision is one[] that trigger[s] WKHHQWU\RIMXGJPHQW´228
When it comes to true finality, these various turns of phrase are the vestiges of an
earlier mode of thought. The true-finality category is now essentially classically defined.
7KH GHILQLWLRQ¶V QHFHVVDU\ DQG VXIILFLHQW HOHPHQWV²deciding the merits and leaving
nothing to do but enter judgment²have more-or-less crystallized into an either/or
question, as illustrated by two modern cases exploring its boundaries. In Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson and Ray Haluch Gravel v. Central Pension Fund, the Court held that an
RUGHUFDQEHWUXO\ILQDODQGDSSHDODEOHHYHQLILWOHDYHVWKHDPRXQWRIDWWRUQH\¶VIHHVWREH
decided later.229 A literal application of the Catlin definition would have required the
opposite outcome, because something else undeniably remained for the trial court to do
besides executing the judgment. But, in Budinich, the Court recognized that the Catlin
GHILQLWLRQ ZDV ³XOtimately question-EHJJLQJ´ EHFDXVH ZKHWKHU D GHFLVLRQ ³HQGV WKH
OLWLJDWLRQRQWKHPHULWV´GHSHQGVRQZKDWLVFRQVLGHUHGDPHULWVLVVXHLQWKHILUVWSODFH230
Therefore, the Court opted for a classical categorical holding and a new bright-line
rule that resolYLQJ DWWRUQH\¶V IHHV FODLPV LV QRW SDUW RI GHFLGLQJ WKH PHULWV LQ RUGHU WR
SUHVHUYH WKH ³RSHUDWLRQDO FRQVLVWHQF\ DQG SUHGLFWDELOLW\ LQ WKH RYHUDOO DSSOLFDWLRQ of
§ ´231 When the question arose again in Ray Haluch, the Court quickly rejected a
variation on the argument from BudinichWKDWDWWRUQH\¶VIHHVVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGSDUWRI
the merits when the fee claim was based on a contract, rather than a statute. 232 It did so by
first repeating the policy reasons identified in Budinich (operational consistency and
SUHGLFWDELOLW\ DQGWKHQUHO\LQJRQWKH³XQLIRUPUXOH´WKDWBudinich established.233 In the
interests of clarity, the Court drew an admittedly arbitrary line. Even when a statute or
FRQWUDFWSURYLGHVWKDWDWWRUQH\¶VIHHVDUHSDUWRIWKHPHULWV DVPDQ\ do), the Court was
imposing its own bright-line definition for purposes of defining true finality under § 1291.
2. The Collateral Order Doctrine
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571 U.S. 177, 183 (2014).
227. Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (emphasis added).
228. Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018) (alteration in the original) (emphasis added) (quoting Mohawk Indus.,
Inc., 558 U.S. at 103).
229. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988); Ray Haluch Gravel, 571 U.S. at 183
(2014).
230. Budinich, 486 U.S. DW KROGLQJWKDWDGHFLVLRQRQDWWRUQH\¶VIHHVLVQRWSDUWRIWKHPHULWVDQGWKXVLV
not necessary before a decision is finDODQGDSSHDODEOH 7KH&RXUWUHOLHGRQLWVHDUOLHUKROGLQJWKDWD³TXHVWLRQ
remaining to be decided after an order ending litigation on the merits does not prevent finality if its resolution
will not alter the order or moot or revise decisions embodied in WKHRUGHU´WREOXUWKHRVWHQVLEOHEULJKW-line of the
Catlin decision. Id. (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 308±09 (1962); Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513±16 (1950)).
231. Id. at 202.
232. Ray Haluch Gravel, 571 U.S. at 184.
233. Id. at 185.
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$VLGH IURP WKH ³WUXH ILQDOLW\´ FDWHJRU\ ZKLFK KDV HVVHQWLDOO\ EHFRPH D FODVVLFDO
category, the most well-developed finality-for-appeal doctrine is the collateral order
doctrine. It has been refined and evolved over time so that it also now almost resembles a
classical rule.
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In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized a new finality-forappeal doctrine, the collateral order doctrine. 234 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., the Court held that § ¶VILQDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWPXVWEHJLYHQD³SUDFWLFDOUDWKHU
WKDQDWHFKQLFDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ´235 DQGLWUHFRJQL]HGDQHZ³VPDOOFODVV>RIRUGHUV@ZKich
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adMXGLFDWHG´236
That original formulation of the collateral-order doctrine was an undertheorized
FRQFHSWXDOUXOHD³SUDFWLFDO´UHOHDVHYDOYHIURPWKHVWULFWDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHILQDO-judgment
UXOHDSSOLFDEOHLIDJLYHQRUGHUZDV³WRRLPSRUWDQW´DQG³WRRLQGHSHQGHQW´IURPWKHUHVW
of the case to defer review.237
6LQFHWKHQWKHGRFWULQHKDVEHHQ³GLVWLOOHG´238 by subsequent cases into a nearly
classical category, with the necessary-and-sufficient elements of a classical definition:
the order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment.239
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234. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
235. Id. at 546±47.
236. Id. at 546.
237. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 449; Anderson, supra note 44, at 559.
238. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006).
239. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); see Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100, 106 (2009).
240. See supra notes 10±15 and accompanying text; see also Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver
Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of
Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.     ³7KH FROODWHUDO RUGHU GRFWULQH LV
something of a hybrid: it is standardlike in determining whether the criteria of the doctrine have been met, but it
\LHOGVDUXOHDVDFHUWDLQFODVVRIRUGHUVWKHUHDIWHUDOZD\VEHFRPHVDSSHDODEOH´ .
241. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.
242. Id. at 545.
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Still, the boundaries of the collateral-order doctrine can be difficult to pin down, hence the
numerous cases described above where the Courts of Appeals have disagreed on its
application.240 And close attention to its origins in Cohen shows how the collateral order
doctrine works as a conceptual category structured radially around positive and negative
prototypes. The positive prototype is the end of the case and the formal final judgment.
The negative prototype is a tentative order that is just a step toward final judgment.
In Cohen, the issue was whether the district court order²declining to apply a statelaw expense-shifting statute to a stockholder derivative suit²was an appealable final
decision.241 To answer that question, the Court made some necessary rhetorical moves
before arriving at the original collateral-order formulation quoted above. First, the Court
had to blur the boundaries of finality, to stretch them beyond a pure classical definition
that encompassed only formal final judgments. It did so by invoking the purpose of § 1292
³WR DOORZ DSSHDOV IURP RUGHUV other than final judgments when they have a final and
LUUHSDUDEOHHIIHFWRQWKHULJKWVRIWKHSDUWLHV´242 The Court used this quick foray into the
legislative intent of a different section to extend the category of final decisions under
§ 1291 beyond final judgments, while maintaining the centrality of the final judgment to
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the category.
Next, the Court had to limit the category somehow. It did so by using a negative
SURWRW\SH ³DQ\ GHFLVLRQ ZKLFK LV WHQWDWLYH LQIRUPDO RU LQFRPSOHWH´ ZKLFK LV RQO\ D
³VWHS>@WRZDUGVWKHILQDOMXGJPHQW´243 That negative prototype marks the outer limit of
the reconfigured final-decisions category. Cohen WKXVUHFDVWWKH³ILQDOGHFLVLRQV´FDWHJRU\
in prototypical terms, first centering the category on (without limiting it to) the positive
prototype of the final judgment, and then limiting the reach of the category by pointing to
the negative prototype of the unappealable tentative decision.
Those positive and negative prototypes are still detectable in the more classical
definition used to identify collateral orders today. Understood in terms of those two
prototypes, the collateral order doctrine covers decisions that: like a final judgment,
³FRQFOXVLYHO\ GHWHUPLQH WKH GLVSXWHG TXHVWLRQ´ DQG ³UHVROYH DQ LPSRUWDQW LVVXH´ EXW
unlike a tentative step toward final judgmentDUH³FRPSOHWHO\VHSDUDWHIURPWKHPHULWVRI
WKHDFWLRQ´DQG³HIIHFWLYHO\XQUHYLHZDEOHRQDSSHDOIURPDILQDOMXGJPHQW´ 244
B. Conceptual Categorical Rules: The Pragmatic Appeals Doctrines
The pragmatic appeals doctrines are conceptual categorical rules that, unlike the
collateral order doctrine, have resisted distillation into classical categorical rules.245 These
doctrines include the hardship-finality doctrine from Forgay and the balancing approach
from Gillespie.246 :KHWKHUWKH\FDQVXUYLYHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH
is unclear, largely because they remain incompletely theorized conceptual categorical
rules.
1. The Hardship Appeals Doctrine
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243. Id. at 546.
244. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468; see Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106.
245. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 405±10.
246. ,XVHWKHWHUP³SUDJPDWLFDSSHDOVGRFWULQHV´EURDGO\WRLQFOXGHERWKWKHForgay hardship doctrine and
Gillespie¶V balancing approach; others treat them as more separate. See 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 55, at §§ 3910, 3911. +DGLWQRWEHHQIRUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJLQCoopers & Lybrand, they would
DOVRKDYHLQFOXGHGWKH³GHDWK-NQHOO´GRFWULQHIRUFHUWDLQFODVVFHUWLILFDWLRQRUGHUVCoopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S.
at 463.
247. See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1825.
248. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see generally 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 55, at § 3910.
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In the mid-nineteenth century, when the Court first began to experiment with flexible
interpretations of the final-judgment rule (before many of the appealability innovations
discussed above), it developed the first finality-for-appeal doctrines.247 In 1848, the Court
held in Forgay v. Conrad that an immediate appeal was permitted from a trial court order
conveying property to an opposing party²even though the case was continuing for an
accounting of the property so the RUGHU ³>X@ndoubtedly [was] not final, in the strict,
WHFKQLFDOVHQVHRIWKDWWHUP´248
Forgay reasoned that such an order was final for appeal because it risked an
immediate harm²the opposing party could execute immediately and quickly sell the
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property²that could not be remedied on appeal.249 Since then, the Forgay hardship
doctrine has rarely been invoked, but it has not disappeared entirely, and there are later
cases recognizing a similar finality-for-appeal doctrine based on irreparable hardship.250
2. The Balancing Approach
Over a century later, the Court took another swing at a pragmatic, flexible finalityfor-appeal doctrine in the 1964 case of Gillespie v. U.S. Steel.251 The case involved state
and federal tort claims.252 When the trial court dismissed all the state claims, the plaintiff
immediately appealed, even though the federal claim remained and the case was not
over.253 The appellate court did not answer whether the decision was final and appealable,
but the Supreme Court held that it was.254 7KH &RXUWUHLWHUDWHGWKDW³µILQDO¶ ZLWKLQWKH
meaning of § 1291 does not necessarily mean the last order possible to be made in a
FDVH´255 DQG RSLQHG WKDW ³ZKHWKHU D UXOLQJ LV µILQDO¶ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI   LV
frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be supported with
equally forceful arguments, and that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all
PDUJLQDOFDVHVFRPLQJZLWKLQZKDWPLJKWZHOOEHFDOOHGWKHµWZLOLJKW]RQH¶RIILQDOLW\´256
(PSKDVL]LQJDJDLQWKDW³WKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIILQDOLW\LV WREHJLYHQDµSUDFWLFDOUDWKHU
than a technical construction,¶´ the Court held the decision was immediately
appealable.257 The decision did not fit into any existing categories of appealable orders: it
was not appealable under Rule 54(b) (the claims were not severable), the collateral order
doctrine (the issue was not separate from the merits), or § 1292(b) (the trial court had not
certified it for appeal).258 But the Court relied on the practical justifications motivating
those three doctrines because, under the circumstances, the benefits of an immediate
DSSHDO DQVZHULQJD³IXQGDPHQWDO´TXHVWLRQLQWKHFDVH RXWZHLJKHGWKHFRVWV WKHFKDQFH
of a second appeal after final judgment). 259 Gillespie¶V practical, context-specific, costbenefit balancing approach was the high-water mark for case-by-case appealability
doctrines.260 But the Court backed away from it later, apparently limiting its holding to its

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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249. Forgay, 47 U.S. DW ³>:@KHQWKHGHFUHHGHFLGHVWKe right to the property in contest, and directs it to
be delivered up by the defendant to the complainant, or directs it to be sold, or directs the defendant to pay a
certain sum of money to the complainant, and the complainant is entitled to have such decree carried immediately
into execution, the decree must be regarded as a final one to that extent, and authorizes an appeal to this court,
although so much of the bill is retained in the Circuit Court as is necessary for the purpose of adjusting by a
furthHU GHFUHH WKH DFFRXQWV EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWLHV SXUVXDQW WR WKH GHFUHH SDVVHG´  Radio Station Wow, Inc. v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362 (1914); Thomson v.
Dean, 74 U.S. (9 Wall.) 342 (1869).
250. Radio Station Wow, 326 U.S. at 120; Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co., 233 U.S. at 362; Thomson, 74 U.S.
at 342.
251. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
252. Id. at 149±50.
253. Id. at 150.
254. Id. 151±52.
255. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949)).
256. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152.
257. Id. at 151±52 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
258. Id. at 152±54.
259. Id.
260. Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 382.
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specific facts.261
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261. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978).
262. See cases cited supra note 249 (post-Forgay cases applying versions of the hardship doctrine); Lammon,
Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 386±410 (describing areas where courts continue to apply versions of the
Gillespie balancing approach).
263. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848); 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at
§ 3910 nn.30±31.
264. See 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3910 nn.38±63.
265. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152±53 (1964) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
266. Id. at 153, 154 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945)).
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At first glance, both the Forgay hardship doctrine and the Gillespie balancing
doctrine seem more like case-by-case standards (like appellate mandamus or certiorari)
than like the final-judgment rule they are supposedly implementing. And there are cases
in the Courts of Appeals, and even occasionally (although not recently) in the Supreme
Court, applying them on a case-by-case basis.262 But, if these pragmatic appeals doctrines
are to survive, they cannot be case-by-FDVHVWDQGDUGV7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDO
imperative requires courts to decide finality-for-appeal categorically, not on a case-bycase basis. And, the final-judgment rule which these doctrines are implementing is a
bright-line rule permitting an appeal, not a standard. Thus, for the pragmatic appeal
doctrines to survive, they must have an identifiable categorical basis and must enable
courts to identify clear categories of decisions.
In their current formulations, the Forgay hardship doctrine and the Gillespie
balancing doctrine do not seem to enable such categorization. It is tempting to try to turn
the Forgay hardship doctrine into a categorical rule allowing an immediate appeal from
any order that immediately transfers property from one party to the other and thereby risks
irreparable harm if an appeal is delayed until the case is concluded. 263 But that cannot be
true, and the boundaries of the doctrine are unclear: perhaps it applies only to decisions
SRVLQJ³VRPHVSHFLDOGDQJHUWRWKHDSSHOODQW´SHUKDSVLWGRHVQRWDSSO\WRGHFLVLRQVOLNH
sanctions which require an immediate payment to the opposing party buWDUH³GHVLJQHGWR
FRQWUROFRQWLQXLQJSURFHHGLQJVUDWKHUWKDQJUDQWUHOLHI´SHUKDSVLWGRHVQRWDSSO\ZKHQ
another doctrine, like the collateral order doctrine or Rule 54(b), could apply. 264
The contours of the Gillespie balancing approach are, if anything, less clear than the
Forgay KDUGVKLS GRFWULQH¶V 7KH &RXUW LQ Gillespie VWDWHG WKDW WKH ³PRVW LPSRUWDQW
FRPSHWLQJ FRQVLGHUDWLRQV´ LQ GHFLGLQJ ILQDOLW\ ZHUH ³WKH LQFRQYHQLHQFH DQG FRVWV RI
piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
RWKHU´265²suggesting that weighing cost against the risk of injustice could be sufficient
to determine appealability. But, once again, that cannot be true, particularly after the
&RXUW¶V FDWHJRULFDO LPSHUDWLYH ,Q Gillespie, the Court suggested a few other
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVZKHWKHU³WKHUHLVUHDVRQWRYLHZWKH[] [GHFLGHG@FODLPVDVVHYHUDEOH´; and,
VRPHZKDWFRQWUDGLFWRULO\ZKHWKHUWKHGHFLVLRQZDV³IXQGDPHQWDOWRWKHIXUWKHUFRQGXFW
RIWKHFDVH´266 But they, too, do not add up to a classical categorical definition.
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CONCLUSION

Features of Final Judgments (the positive prototype):
x Ends the proceedings268;
x Conclusively decides a question269;
x Decides a merits question270;
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267. See supra Part II.B.2.
268. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,  ³[G]enerally one which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.´ 
269. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (emphasis added) ³conclusively determine the
disputed questioQ´ ; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
270. Cohen, 337 U.S. at  ³ILQDOO\GHWHUPLQHFODLPVRIULJKW´ 
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It is imperative, and perhaps inevitable, that the pragmatic appeals doctrines²or
other similarly conceptual categorical finality-for-appeal doctrines²survive. The
inevitable pressure for innovation in deciding appealability is an unstoppable force; and
tKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHis an immovable object. Although the various
appealability doctrines help avoid many collisions, courts and litigants keep finding new
cases where they require greater flexibility than the existing doctrines provide. Courts need
the freedom to develop new, flexible, but not entirely unbounded, appealability doctrines.
An explicitly conceptual approach could address appeals that do not fit within
existing categories. A conceptual approach will eventually allow courts to identify new
categories of decisions to be considered final-for-appeal. Fuzzy and undefined conceptual
categories can, over time, give rise to more definite classical categories²but only if the
courts have the opportunity to implement and iterate on them. Shutting down emerging
finality-for-DSSHDO GRFWULQHV EHFDXVH WKH\ GR QRW FRQIRUP WR WKH &RXUW¶V FDWHJRULFDO
imperative would frustrate that development.
The conceptual development of the pragmatic appealability doctrines through future
cases will take time. Most appealability issues are already addressed by the more
developed appealability doctrines, so the conceptual approach to finality-for-appeal will
only come into play occasionally. But we can begin to sketch a concept model of finalityfor-appeal to be used by courts. As explained above, conceptual categories are radially
constructed based on similarity to positive and negative prototypes and exemplars, and
that similarity depends on shared family resemblances, an overlap of some, but not
necessarily all, features.267 The pragmatic appeals doctrines each identify a few salient
features. But for those doctrines to evolve, or for courts to develop new finality-for-appeal
categories, courts must be allowed to create new categories of appealable orders, described
by new sets of shared features.
The evolution of the collateral order doctrine demonstrates how this would work.
That doctrine shows the appropriate positive and negative prototypes for conceptualizing
new finality-for-appeal categories. The positive prototype is the idea of a final judgment
that ends the case; the negative prototype is the idea of a tentative order that is just a step
in the case. Drawing on all of the appealability doctrines, we can compile a non-exhaustive
list of those prototypes¶ relevant features. Any new conceptual finality-for-appeal doctrine
will draw on some combination of these features:
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x ,VLPSRUWDQWWRDSDUW\¶VULJKWV 271;
x Immediately transfers property272;
x Is important to resolving the case273;
x Is, if erroneous, only reparable if reviewed now274;
x Is distinct from the rest of the case275;
x Is procedurally distinct or identifiable 276;
x Is more efficient to review now277;
Features of Tentative-Step Orders (the negative prototype):
x Is provisional278;
x Is purely procedural279;
x Is mooted by a final merits appeal280;
x Is inefficient to review now281;
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271. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 ³UHVROYHDQLPSRUWDQWLVVXH´ Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (emphasis
added) ³ILQDOOy determine claims of right´ 
272. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848).
273. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 ³UHVROYHDQLPSRUWDQWLVVXH´ .
274. Cohen, 337 U.S. at  ³WRRLPSRUWDQWWREHGHQLHGUHYLHZDQGWRRLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHFDXVHLWVHOIWR
UHTXLUHWKDWDSSHOODWHFRQVLGHUDWLRQEHGHIHUUHGXQWLOWKHZKROHFDVHLVDGMXGLFDWHG´ .
275. Id. ³VHSDUDEOHIURPDQGFROODWHUDOWRULJKWVDVVHUWHGLQWKHDFWLRQ´; ³LQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHFDXVHLWVHOI´ 
276. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), (c); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
277. FED. R. CIV. P.  E  ³QR MXVW UHDVRQ IRU GHOD\´   86&   E  ³LPPHGLDWH DSSHDO . . . may
materially advance the ultimate terminaWLRQRIWKHOLWLJDWLRQ´ 
278. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 ³DQ\GHFLVLRQZKLFKLVWHQWDWLYHLQIRUPDORULQFRPSOHWH´ZKLFKLVRQO\D³VWHS>@
towards [the] ILQDOMXGJPHQW´ .
279. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981)) ³0RKDZNGRHVQRWGLVSXWHWKDWµZHKDYHJHQHUDOO\GHQLHGUHYLHZRI
SUHWULDOGLVFRYHU\RUGHUV¶´ .
280. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468   QRW³FRPSOHWHO\VHSDUDWHIURPWKHPHrits of
WKHDFWLRQ´RU³HIIHFWLYHO\XQUHYLHZDEOHRQDSSHDOIURPDILQDOMXGJPHQW´ 
281. 6HH WKH PDQ\ ZDUQLQJV DJDLQVW WKHGDQJHUV RI ³SLHFHPHDO´ DSSHDOV 'LFNLQVRQ Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 325, 325 (1940); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 439, 441 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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These lists reflect some of the features of the positive and negative prototypes that
the existing finality doctrines identify as potentially salient to the concept of finality. These
lists are necessarily impressionistic and non-exhaustive²they are trying to capture
intuitive understandings that are often not explicitly stated. Importantly, these features are
not necessary-and-sufficient conditions; they need not all be present to mark an order as
falling into a category (just as not all birds must fly to fall in the category ³%LUGV´ Indeed,
some of them are contradictory and could not both be features of the same order. New
conceptual categories of appealable orders could be described by family resemblances
among orders that each share some, but not all, of a relevant set of features. Although
courts and rule-makers have identified more features of the positive prototype than the
negative one (likely because they have focused on identifying the elements of finality),
future cases could recognize new features of either prototype, or new combinations of
already recognized features, to delineate new categories of final-for-appeal decisions.
***
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHGLUHFWLQJWKDWILQDOLW\-for-appeal must
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be decided only for categories of orders aims to curtail the proliferation of new case-bycase appealability rulings. But it must not be read to shut down the possibility of judicial
innovations in appealability. Parties and judges have always used conceptual thinking²
analogies and metaphors, similarity and typicality, prototypes and exemplars, family
resemblances and shared features²to identify new categories for immediate appeals. They
should continue to do so. Indeed, they should explicitly describe the conceptual models
guiding their thinking, identifying features that each proposed new category of orders
shares with existing positive and negative prototypes of appealability. Perhaps further
common-law percolation will reveal new classical categories of orders that should be
considered final-for-appeal. But to get there, judges need to retain the freedom and
flexibility of a conceptual approach.
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